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Jason Scott Johnston† 
Abstract 
This Article sets out a positive theory that explains the late 
twentieth-century federalization of American environmental law. On 
this theory, federalization occurred not because states had failed to 
regulate to reduce air and water pollution, but because older and 
heavily developed states moving toward such regulation gained a 
relative competitive advantage by imposing minimum standards on 
less developed and less polluted states (in the case of air), and by 
receiving subsidies from such regions (for water pollution reduction). 
The failure of federalization in the case of climate change is directly 
explained by this theory: the majority of states would be certain short 
and medium term net losers from such legislation. 
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Introduction 
This Article sets out a positive theory that helps to explain the 
federalization of environmental law and applies that theory to selected 
episodes in the recent history of federal environmental law in the 
United States. On my theory, federalization occurs not because the 
activities of one State spillover and cause harm in other States. Nor 
does federalization occur because States are failing to regulate to curb 
harm from pollution because they fear losing industry. Instead, 
federalization occurs when a large number of localities have reached a 
stage of development where their citizens have a level of affluence and 
leisure time that they demand a cleaner environment and reduced 
pollution. Such citizens would support local pollution reduction 
regulations, but federal pollution legislation can make them strictly 
better off in two ways.  
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One kind of federal environmental law that dominates local 
controls, illustrated by the federal Clean Air Act,1 imposes uniform 
emission reduction standards on all localities within the federation.2 
As there is local demand within developed states and localities for 
pollution control, federal environmental standards are supported by 
local environmentalists and recreationists in such places. But, 
crucially, as such laws provide economic protection against 
competition for industry from lesser developed, less polluted states 
and localities, the laws also are supported by local industry and labor 
in the heavily polluted states and localities. There thus emerges a 
coalition defined by both region and interest that successfully 
supports the imposition of uniform federal environmental standards. 
The second kind of federal law that can make citizens who 
demand local pollution reduction strictly better off relative to local 
regulation is one that directly subsidizes pollution reduction in highly 
industrialized or rapidly industrializing locations. This type of law, 
illustrated by the federal Clean Water Act,3 enjoys even broader 
support, as it promises a subsidy both to places that are already 
industrialized with a pollution problem and those that anticipate 
rapid industrialization in the future.4 In the most straightforward 
way, the law is paid for by people who reside in less industrialized 
and polluted areas.  
This theory explains a number of important facts about the 
history of the Clean Air Act. It explains, directly, the imposition of 
technology-based, facility-specific pollution control standards in less 
developed, cleaner regions of the country (the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration or PSD program). Less directly, it can 
explain the pattern of implementation of ostensibly uniform national 
standards. The theory recasts the apparent failure of the Clean Air 
Act to actually generate national uniformity in air quality not as a 
problem, but as precisely what Congress intended in passing the law: 
older and more heavily polluted areas were, on my theory, never 
intended to be forced to incur the enormous costs achieving 
unpolluted air.5 Finally, the theory explains the gradual but inevitable 
loss of state authority under the Clean Air Act. Whatever discretion 
might seem to have been given to the States by the Clean Air Act’s 
regime of “cooperative federalism” to fine tune their environmental 
 
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)). 
2. See infra Part III.B.1.  
3. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006)).  
4. See infra Part III.A.  
5. See infra Part III.B.3.b.  
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regulations in light of local costs and benefits of pollution control is 
inconsistent with both the regional protectionist and national 
preservationist objectives, both of which necessitate a drastic 
curtailment of local regulatory authority to balance costs and benefits.  
The first Part of this Article reviews the theory of environmental 
federalization taken from the field of economics known as public 
finance. This branch of economics has generated a normative theory 
that shows how, under certain assumptions, regulatory 
decentralization generates regulatory outcomes that make everyone in 
a federation better off than under a system of uniform federal 
regulation. The most important impact of this theory on public law 
has been not in this result, however, but in the demonstration that 
when various assumptions are violated, the case for regulatory 
decentralization disappears or is greatly weakened. In this way, legal 
scholars in particular have come to think of normative public finance 
theory as generating not only a justification for the late twentieth 
century federalization of American environmental law, but also a 
positive theory that explains why federalization occurred.  
By reviewing the stylized facts of late twentieth-century American 
regional economic development and state and local air pollution 
regulation, the second Part of this Article shows that as a positive 
matter, federal environmental law did not arise because States were 
failing to deal with the air pollution problem, but because wherever 
there was a problem, the States were regulating. Together with the 
historical fact that many regions of the country were very little 
developed as of 1970, with no perception of an air pollution problem, 
the history of effective state and local regulation suggests that an 
alternative positive theory is required. The third Part of this Article 
supplies such a theory with recent economic work showing how 
federal minimum standards can arise as an equilibrium under majority 
rule in a federal legislature. In such an equilibrium, the federal 
minimum does not bind in the majority of jurisdictions (who are free 
to regulate more stringently), but does bind in a minority of 
jurisdictions. At the state level, federalization is counter-majoritarian, 
in that it imposes the preferences of minority pro-environmental 
voters in states whose median voter opposes the federal minimum 
standard.  
This model explains federal environmental law as arising from a 
coalition among anti-development environmentalist advocates in 
relatively undeveloped, unpolluted states and a broad-based set of 
voters including both industry and labor in heavily developed, 
polluted States. The final Part of this Article extends this same model 
to explain an important failure to federalize: Congressional inaction 
on federal climate change legislation. Unlike water and air pollution 
circa 1970, there are no widely perceived short-term local 
environmental benefits from a circa 2014 federal law that would 
impose costs on or otherwise limit carbon dioxide emissions. 
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Environmental benefits, if any, would be realized in the far distant 
future, and would be primarily non-local. The demand for such 
legislation is driven by Congressional representatives who are not just 
environmentally liberal ideologically and Democrat by party affiliation 
but, equally importantly, come from the minority of states that are 
singular in that they rely exceptionally heavily on sources of power, 
hydro and nuclear, that would be unaffected by a federal law 
imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions. Such federal legislation 
would confer a potentially large relative competitive advantage on 
such states. But this short term economic advantage would be offset 
by the short term competitive disadvantage that federal carbon 
dioxide emission controls would cause in the majority of states that 
are much more reliant upon burning coal, or natural gas, for electric 
power. The political economics of carbon dioxide emission controls 
thus disfavors federalization of such controls. 
I. The Approach from Normative Public Finance 
A. The Simple Economic Optimality of  
Decentralized Environmental Regulation 
The central economic justification for the decentralization of 
environmental regulation is drawn from the field of public finance 
economics known as the theory of fiscal federalism.6 That theory sets 
out a “general normative framework for the assignment of functions 
to different levels of government.”7 The foundation of that framework 
is what has been aptly called8 the “matching principle”: the 
“presumption that the provision of public services should be located 
at the lowest level of government encompassing in a spatial sense, the 
relevant benefits and costs.”9 This presumption is justified whenever 
 
6. For a very clear and comprehensive overview of this theory by one of its 
founders, see Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 
J. Econ. Literature 1120 (1999). 
7. Id. at 1121. 
8. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to 
Improve Environmental Policy (1996). 
9. Oates, supra note 6, at 1122. For the original statements of this 
principle, see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (1972); see also 
James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of 
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 
113 (1962); Mancur Olson Jr., The Principle of “Fiscal Equivalence”: 
The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government, 
59 Am. Econ. Rev. 479, 486 (1969). For an alternative statement, see 
Wallace E. Oates, Commentary, On Environmental Federalism, 83 
Va. L. Rev. 1321, 1323 (1997) (“[S]ervices should be provided by the 
smallest jurisdiction that encompasses the geographical expanse of the 
benefits and costs associated with the service.”). 
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the demand for and costs of local public goods varies across 
jurisdictions. For then overall or global social welfare is higher when 
decentralized jurisdictions offer varying levels of such goods than 
when the national government provides a uniform level.10  
An example will clarify how this theory works, and the 
assumptions it depends upon. Suppose that the cleanup of a local lake 
benefits only people who live in the jurisdiction where the lake is 
located, and the costs are also borne entirely by local residents. Now 
assume that local political representatives perfectly mirror the 
preferences of their constituents, and (for simplicity) assume that 
every local resident gets the same benefits and costs from cleanup. 
Under these assumptions, any decision in the local legislature will be 
unanimous, and that legislature will mandate cleanup if and only if 
the local benefits of cleanup exceed the local costs. If the costs are 
$100 but the benefits are only fifty dollars each distributed equally 
over all local voters, then the legislature will not vote in favor of 
cleanup. If the benefits are instead $150, then cleanup will occur.  
Now suppose that we have a mix of three types of jurisdictions, 
(which I’ll call states for concreteness) each completely homogeneous 
across residents, each with a perfectly representative legislature and 
each with a polluted lake. Now suppose that the cost of cleanup is 
$100 in each of the three jurisdictions, but the benefit varies, twenty 
dollars in First State, $110 in Second State, and $150 in Third State. 
Clearly in simple cost-benefit terms, cleanup of the lake is only cost-
benefit justified in Second and Third States. Under decentralized, 
local legislative control of the cleanup decision, cleanup will only 
indeed occur in these States, just as basic economics dictates.  
Continuing with this three-jurisdiction example, we see the 
potential economic costs that regulatory centralization could impose. 
For suppose that the cleanup decision must be uniform across our 
three-state federation—that is, either all jurisdictions clean up their 
lakes or none do—and suppose that the decision will be taken by 
majority decision in a perfectly representative central (federal) 
legislature. Under majority rule and with proportionate representation 
in the federal legislature, the centralized majority decision will be to 
cleanup all three lakes. Cleanup is cost-benefit justified in Second and 
Third, but not in First State. The uniform, centralized majority rule 
regulatory decision to clean up all the lakes leads to an economic loss 
 
10. Oates, supra note 6, at 1122. Perhaps the earliest demonstration of this 
point is from Sam Peltzman and T. Nicolaus Tideman. See Sam 
Peltzman & T. Nicolaus Tidemand, Local Versus National Pollution 
Control: Note, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 959 (1972) (“[N]ationally uniform 
pollution charges could only be optimal in the long run in a very 
unusual world and particularly are not optimal in this world in the short 
run (now), and further that a temporally efficient set of charges is more 
likely to emerge under local rather than federal control.”). 
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relative to the decision under decentralized control, where cleanup 
occurs if and only if cost-benefit justified. 
This example portrays the basic case for decentralization versus 
centralization of environmental regulation. If costs and benefits vary 
across jurisdictions so that the optimal level of environmental 
regulation (which may include no regulation at all) varies across 
jurisdictions, then decentralized, variable regulation may be superior 
to a centrally determined uniform regulation.  
B. Complicating the Story, and Justifying Regulatory Centralization 
This example hinges on a very large number of both explicit and 
implicit assumptions. Violation of any one of a number of these can 
complicate or even destroy the economic optimality of decentralized 
environmental regulation and provide a justification for regulatory 
centralization. Here are some of the most important complications.  
1. Failure to Internalize the Full Benefits of Pollution Reduction 
(Interstate Externalities) 
If pollution reduction or environmental cleanup (hereafter, I shall 
refer simply to pollution reduction) benefits primarily people outside 
the State that has regulatory authority over the environmental 
regulatory decision, but the costs fall primarily locally, then the local 
State will have too weak an incentive (from a federal point of view) 
for pollution reduction. Its citizens may decide not to clean up the 
lake, even though from a global point of view, total benefits (local and 
non-local) exceed total costs.  
Of course, the assumption that costs and benefits are entirely 
borne by citizens of the jurisdiction with regulatory authority can also 
be violated in the other direction. When the benefits of pollution 
cleanup are local but the costs can be externalized outside the 
jurisdiction, then local jurisdictions may have too great an incentive 
to engage in environmental cleanup.  
As a practical matter, the first of these two cases—where the 
benefits of pollution reduction are externalized—has been the more 
important. This first case in fact corresponds to the problem of 
interstate externalities, where pollution from activities in one state 
causes harm in another. When the costs of pollution reduction are 
borne primarily in the polluting state, but significant benefits accrue 
out of state, the polluting state will have too little incentive to reduce 
its pollution. With such negative interstate externalities, decentralized 
decision making standing alone will lead to economically suboptimal 
pollution reduction. 
We say standing alone because at least as a theoretical matter, 
decentralization is not necessarily inconsistent with optimal pollution 
control even with interstate externalities. Theoretically, if 
jurisdictions could costlessly bargain with one another, then victim 
states would have an incentive to pay polluter states to reduce their 
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pollution. Anytime the benefits of pollution reduction are bigger than 
the costs, a mutually beneficial deal to reduce pollution is at least in 
theory possible. 
As a practical matter, however, there are numerous impediments 
to interstate bargaining to reduce pollution. Bargains among 
American states—interstate compacts—are legally enforceable only 
if authorized by Congress. Without such authorization, such deals 
must be self-enforcing to be effective. Even with a framework for the 
legal enforcement of interstate bargains, there remains the political 
problem for any politician proposing to tax local citizens to raise the 
funds to pay a neighboring jurisdiction to reduce its pollution. In the 
United States, Congress can authorize interstate compacts, and it can 
also pass federal pollution control legislation. Federal legislation 
requiring an adjacent state to reduce its pollution shifts the costs of 
pollution reduction to the polluting state, and it is hard to envision 
circumstances in which a victim state politician is not better off when 
the costs are borne by citizens of the polluting state than she would 
be were she to propose that her own constituents increase their taxes 
to pay the polluting state to reduce its pollution.  
2. Inter-jurisdictional Competition  
The argument for decentralized environmental regulation hinges 
on the intra-jurisdictional internalization of all costs and benefits of 
pollution control. However, even if all the benefits and costs of 
pollution reduction are internalized to a jurisdiction, any jurisdiction 
is part of a larger world, and as part of larger political-economic 
world, jurisdictions compete against one another. They compete for 
both businesses—which bring jobs and tax revenues but possibly also 
pollution—and for residents, who contribute tax revenues but also 
generate their own costs, in the form of congestion of various local 
public goods such as parks. 
Of the two types of competition, economists have generally looked 
upon the second type of competition—for residents—as a force 
favoring strong (sometimes too strong) local environmental 
protection. For local environmental quality, like parks, police, and fire 
protection, is a local public good—something that all residents of a 
jurisdiction are able to enjoy as a right of residency. Mobility of 
residents across jurisdictions increases the benefits of decentralization. 
If people sort themselves by choosing to live in jurisdictions that offer 
their preferred tax—public goods packages, they impose competitive 
pressure on local jurisdictions to provide high environmental quality 
at a reasonable tax cost.11 As William Fischel has demonstrated and 
 
11. The conjecture that competition among jurisdictions will generate the 
globally optimal provision of local public goods in a world where people 
have heterogeneous tastes for public goods is known as the Tiebout 
Hypothesis, after Charles Tiebout. E.g., Charles Tiebout, A Pure 
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illustrated concretely, when residents are homeowners, their desire to 
maximize the value of their homes creates a strong incentive to vote 
for local governments that minimize the cost of providing high-quality 
local public goods.12  
The social welfare consequences of inter-jurisdictional competition 
for businesses (mobile capital) are more complex. Indeed, such 
competition has been called a “widespread and fundamental 
challenge”13 to the economic case for regulatory decentralization. In 
areas ranging far beyond environmental regulation (to include state 
corporate law, welfare reform, and international tax policy), the “race 
to the bottom story” has been put forward as justifying regulatory 
centralization.14 It is relatively straightforward to show that if local  
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). The 
Tiebout Hypothesis holds as a theoretical matter only if a large number 
of things are true—such as subsidies between communities—so many, in 
fact, that it is fair to say that the hypothesis is in general false. See 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five 
Years After Tiebout: A Perspective, in Local Provision of Public 
Services: The Tiebout Model After Twenty-Five Years 17, 35 
(George Zodrow ed., 1983) (identifying five problems with sustaining 
efficient local public goods equilibrium). There is not much empirical 
evidence supporting the assumption of preference heterogeneity that 
underlies the Teibout hypothesis. See Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental 
Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 64 Case Western 
Res. L. Rev. 1669, 1699 (2014) (“In sum, the empirical evidence 
regarding preference heterogeneity and its implications on environmental 
federalism is limited and incomplete.”). However, the Tiebout model’s 
implication that more heterogeneous resident preferences ought to result 
in more decentralized policy-making has recently been confirmed. See 
Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Endogenous Policy 
Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism, 
110 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (2002) (finding state liquor policy is more likely to 
be decentralized in states where voters have more extreme tastes).  
12. See William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 39–71 (2001) 
(applying the Tiebout hypothesis to the real estate market).  
13. Oates, supra note 6, at 1134–35. 
14. For example, Richard B. Stewart discusses the race-to-the-bottom 
justification in the environmental area. See Richard B. Stewart, 
Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 
1211–19 (1977) (explaining four “structural factors” for centralized 
environmental policy: the Tragedy of the Commons, disparities in 
effective representation, spillovers, and moral ideals). John Douglas 
Wilson precisely summarizes and explains the literature on the race-to-
the-bottom in tax. See John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax 
Competition, 52 Nat’l Tax J. 269 (1999). For a review of the literature 
on how interjurisdictional competition for business constrains the ability 
of jurisdictions to pursue redistributive welfare policies, see David E. 
Wildasin, Factor Mobility and Redistributive Policy: Local and 
International Perspectives, in Public Finance in a Changing World 
151 (Peter Birch Sørenson ed., 1998).  
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governments perfectly represent all the preferences of local residents, 
then there will be no race-to-the-bottom. Governments will balance 
off the local benefits of reduced pollution against local costs, including 
the cost of jobs and taxes lost when tougher environmental standards 
cause capital flight.15 Like many other results in theoretical public 
finance, however, this result depends on a long list of assumptions. 
These include assuming that: (1) all citizens of the jurisdiction are 
homogeneous in how they benefit from and bear the cost of pollution 
reduction; (2) all citizens work for the polluting industry; (3) labor is 
immobile and in fixed supply; (4) capital is perfectly mobile and 
competitively supplied; (5) pollution is regulated by a system of 
pollution taxes with tax revenues returned to local citizens; and 
(6) that each jurisdiction chooses the level of environmental 
regulatory stringency that maximizes the utility of the median voter. 
These assumptions ensure that all the costs and benefits of local 
pollution control are internalized to the local jurisdictional decision 
even when the jurisdictions compete against each other for mobile 
capital. The theoretical literature supplies reasons to think that 
decentralization itself may generate incentives so that some of the 
assumptions—such as faithful political representation of local voter 
preferences—may actually be realized. Such work has shown that 
under decentralization, politicians may face a bigger electoral penalty 
for diverting tax revenues to their own purposes,16 and face a higher 
probability of being voted out of office for corruption more generally.17  
 
15. This basic point was made long ago by Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal 
Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 Ecology L.Q. 193, 203–04 (1974). 
Richard L. Revesz made the argument significant in public law 
scholarship, See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate 
Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992). 
The general demonstration that there may be no race-to-the-bottom 
(the model that Revesz explains for lawyers) was developed by Wallace 
E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among 
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. Pub. 
Econ. 333 (1988). The basic idea underlying Oates and Schwab’s model 
is that if jurisdictions internalize both the costs—lost taxes on mobile 
capital—and benefits of tougher local environmental quality, then they 
ought to set locally optimal environmental quality standards. Id. at 350. 
Their result hinges upon many underlying assumptions: homogeneous 
populations within jurisdictions, local taxes only on capital that are 
returned to residents dollar for dollar for residents to use to purchase 
private consumption goods, no non-environmental local public goods, 
immobile labor, and the absence of any kind of jurisdictional market 
power in the market for locations. Id. at 336–41. 
16. See, e.g., Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Political 
Economics: Explaining Economic Policy 228–30 (2000) (concluding 
that national elections weaken the link between good performance and 
reappointment); Paul Seabright, Accountability and Decentralization in 
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Still, violation of one or more of these assumptions can generate 
forces that cause local environmental regulation to be either too lax or 
too stringent. If, for example, some local citizens, including the 
median voter, work in the polluting industry while others do not, then 
local environmental standards may be too lax.18 
3. Scale Economies and the Possibility of  
Non-Uniform Centralized Regulation 
The economic case for decentralized environmental regulation 
begins by assuming that the alternative to local environmental 
standards that perfectly reflect the local costs and benefits of 
pollution reduction are national (more generally, centralized) 
standards that are uniform across jurisdictions and so completely 
insensitive to variation in local benefits and costs. When centralized 
standards can themselves be varied with local costs and benefits, the 
case for centralization may become much stronger.19 Moreover, if 
there are scale economies in regulation, so that regulatory costs fall as 
 
Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model, 40 Eur. Econ. Rev. 61 
(1996) (modeling the allocation of rights under incomplete contracts).  
17. Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, Decentralization and Electoral 
Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare, 25 Eur. J. 
Pol. Econ. 385, 389 (2009).  
18. As is typical of general equilibrium models in public finance, all sorts of 
results—including too much local environmental protection and too 
little—are generated when different subsets of these assumptions are 
relaxed. For an explication, see Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann, Fiscal 
Policy and Environmental Welfare: Modelling Inter 
jurisdictional Competition 89–112 (1998); Arik Levinson, A Note on 
Environmental Federalism: Interpreting Some Contradictory Results, 33 
J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 359, 362–65 (1997); John Douglas Wilson, 
Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical 
Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in 1 Fair Trade and 
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade: Economic 
Analysis 393, 405 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
The possibility that states might have overly lax environmental 
regulations in order to attract capital and the jobs and revenues it 
brings is really just a particular instance of the more general problem 
that jurisdictions might undersupply costly local public goods in order 
to keep taxes low. Again, virtually any result is possible depending upon 
the model’s underlying assumptions. See Dietmar Wellisch, Theory 
of Public Finance in a Federal State 58–87 (2000); David E. 
Wildasin, Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition, 35 J. Pub. 
Econ. 229, 237 (1988).  
19. Although, as the caveat indicates, this depends upon the political 
economics of centralized standard setting—viz. with the way in which 
central standards actually vary with local costs and benefits. Cf. Ben 
Lockwood, Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization, 69 Rev. 
Econ. Stud. 313, 324–25 (2002) (arguing that inefficient project choice 
and not policy uniformity contributes to the costs of centralization). 
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a centralized (but possibly locally tailored) standard is adopted in 
place of independent regulatory decision making by local jurisdictions, 
then the case for regulatory centralization becomes stronger still.20 
C. The (Inevitable) Failure of Normative Public Finance to Offer a 
Positive Theory of Environmental Federalization 
While it begins from a presumption in favor of regulatory 
decentralization, the economic theory of fiscal federalism thus ends up 
providing a theoretical justification for centralization as a corrective 
for what seems to be inevitable state regulatory failure. In this, its 
impact on environmental law scholarship has been all too great. From 
the theoretical demonstration that interstate externalities and the 
race-to-the-bottom may make decentralized environmental regulation 
inefficient, generations of environmental law scholars have come to 
routinely assume that state regulatory failure was the reason why 
federal environmental regulation expanded so greatly during the late 
twentieth century.21 Such scholars take it as a matter of faith that 
federal legislation of the 1970–1980 Environmentalist era, such as the 
Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, were made necessary by the 
failure of the states to do anything about pollution.22 The standard 
story is that sometime around the first Earth Day in 1970, there was 
a great awakening of American environmental consciousness, leading  
20. See Ben Lockwood, The Political Economy of Decentralization, in 
Handbook of Fiscal Federalism 33 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Grigorio 
Brosio eds., 2006). 
21. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air 
Act, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1183, 1221–22 (1995) [hereinafter Dwyer, Practice 
of Federalism] (asserting that by 1970, the states had “done little to 
address the worsening air pollution problem,” and “most states could 
not be relied upon to establish an adequate environmental policy”). 
John P. Dwyer argues that:  
Even without interstate competition for business, states may 
have been unreasonably biased against environmental 
protection. State and local officials may have been unduly 
sensitive . . . to the relatively concrete, immediate costs of 
federal regulation and foregone development, and indifferent to 
the value of the highly diffuse, amorphous, future benefits of 
environmental regulation. 
 Id. at 1222 (footnote omitted); See also John P. Dwyer, The Role of 
State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from 
Environmental Regulation, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203, 224 
(1997) [hereinafter Dwyer, Lessons] (“Although they had two decades to 
address the growing seriousness of environmental problems, states did 
virtually nothing. Various failed efforts to get states to set and enforce 
air and water pollution standards convinced federal policy makers in the 
early 1970s that the only viable solution was federal regulation.”). 
22. See Dwyer, Lessons, supra note 21, at 224; Dwyer, Practice of 
Federalism, supra note 21, at 1221–22. 
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to federal environmental regulation that led to something finally being 
done about the pollution problem.  
For the theoretical explanation for the presumed failure of State 
regulation, environmental scholars typically look to the two stories 
supplied by the theory of fiscal federalism: the “race to the bottom” 
and interstate externalities. On the race-to-the-bottom story, federal 
environmental legislation emerges as a solution to a nationally 
disastrous competition among the states for mobile capital and the 
jobs and taxes it brings. Hence, on that story, one ought to observe 
the federal environmental regulation arose after States began to 
weaken their environmental regulations in response to increased 
interstate capital mobility. On the interstate externalities story, the 
push for federal environmental regulation should have coincided with 
an increasing awareness by voters of the extent to which pollution in 
one state spilled over into other states, and with the failure of states 
to cooperate via interstate compacts and other arrangements to do 
anything about such spillovers.  
When environmental law scholars have actually looked closely at 
federal regulatory legislation, they been appalled by the divergence 
between what public finance theory says should happen and what 
Congress has actually done. In what remains perhaps the most 
brilliant work on the political economy of federal environmental 
regulation, Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler’s Clean Coal/Dirty 
Air, the authors describe in considerable detail how a coalition 
between environmentalists and Eastern coal industry interests 
succeeded in amending the Clean Air Act in 1977 to require the use of 
scrubber technology and high sulfur Eastern coal.23 This amendment 
did little or nothing about the problem of sulfur-dioxide pollution that 
it was ostensibly designed to solve.24 Committed to the social welfare 
vision of federal environmental legislation as the solution to 
externalities problems that the states either couldn’t or wouldn’t 
address, Ackerman and Hassler spend most of Clean Coal/Dirty Air 
developing an almost desperate ad hoc explanation for how Congress 
could have gone so badly and terribly wrong. In the end, the most 
striking thing about Clean Coal/Dirty Air is not its wonderful 
description of the politics driving the 1977 sulfur-dioxide amendments, 
but its revelation of the utter explanatory failure of the existing 
public finance-inspired paradigm within which federal environmental 
regulation has come to be understood.  
 
23. Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty 
Air: Or How the Clean Air Became a Multibillion-Dollar 
Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should 
Be Done About It 36–38, 55–56 (1981). 
24. Id. at 59–78.  
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Over the last several decades, there has been growing awareness 
of both the theoretical problems with the existing public finance-
inspired account for federal environmental regulation25 and of the 
striking divorce between the theoretical objective behind federal 
environmental law and what it has actually accomplished.26 Whatever 
its value as a general normative guide, the theory of optimal 
regulatory decentralization has failed as a positive theory explaining 
American environmental regulatory centralization. 
II. Setting the Stage: American Development and the 
Demand for Environmental Improvement, Circa 1970 
The great wave of federal environmental legislation passed during 
the 1970s brought very concrete and sizeable benefits to certain 
clearly identified States and regions.27 The basic structure of a federal  
25. There are two strands in the literature. Very early on, law and 
economics critics pointed out that the basic lesson from the economic 
theory of fiscal federalism was not the decentralization did not work, 
but that it was presumptively superior given heterogeneous jurisdictions. 
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming 
Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1355–59 (1985); James E. 
Krier, Commentary, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: 
Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 323, 324–35 (1974). As 
is typical of general equilibrium models in public finance, all sorts of 
results—including too much local environmental protection and too 
little—are generated when different subsets of these assumptions are 
relaxed. See Bayindir-Upmann, supra note 18; Levinson, supra note 
18, at 359–60; Wilson, supra note 18, at 405. The possibility that States 
might have overly lax environmental regulations in order to attract 
capital and the jobs and revenues it brings is really just a particular 
instance of the more general problem that jurisdictions might 
undersupply costly local public goods in order to keep taxes low. Again, 
virtually any result is possible depending upon the model’s underlying 
assumptions. See Wildasin, supra note 18, at 237; Wellisch, supra note 
18, at 58–87. 
26. As observed by Jonathan H. Adler, and as detailed below, perhaps the 
greatest disjunction between the public finance theory and legislative 
reality is that the federal environmental laws addressed almost entirely 
local, rather than interstate problems. Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional 
Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 130 
(2005). The 1970 Clean Air Act did not address interstate air pollution, 
and although the 1977 Act did, the provisions it contained were weak 
and proved ineffective. Dwyer, Practice of Federalism, supra note 21, at 
1220. For one of the most powerful critique of the Clean Air Act’s 
failure to effectively regulate interstate air pollution, see Richard L. 
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 2341, 2346 (1996) (arguing that rather than regulating air 
pollution, the Clean Air Act’s inability to control interstate externalities 
may have exacerbated air pollution). 
27. What remains the classic public choice analysis of how such geographic 
redistribution motivated federal environmental laws is B. Peter 
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legislature whose members represent geographic (rather than 
functional or industry) voting units makes it exceptionally responsive 
to such geographically targeted benefits.28 Federal environmental 
legislation arose when and because the relatively concentrated costs of 
economic development in older, more heavily developed parts of the 
country created overwhelming support for environmental cleanup 
there and for the preservation of relatively pristine, undeveloped 
natural environments in newer, less heavily developed parts of the 
country. Its success was neither puzzling nor paradoxical, but rather 
the logically inevitable result of the political incentives for 
federalization created by regionally divergent paths of economic 
development and environmental degradation. 
On this theory, rather than solving a problem of too much 
competition among the states for mobile capital, or uncontrolled 
interstate externalities, environmental centralization occurs in order 
to prevent capital from moving to the relatively clean air and water, 
and cheap land and labor found in relatively undeveloped regions of 
the country. Rather than stopping locally undesirable interstate 
regulatory competition, federal environmental laws prevent locally 
beneficial interstate economic competition. Likewise, whereas the 
interstate externality story centers on physical spillovers of pollution 
across state borders, my account clarifies that whether there are 
physical externalities or not is really irrelevant.  
This theory explains both successful and failed attempts at 
environmental federalization. In the case of the Clean Air Act, 
representatives of older and more industrialized states supported 
federal minimum pollution reduction standards because they believed 
that those standards were necessary to enable their states to reduce 
pollution without losing too many factories to newer, less polluted 
parts of the country. Such centralized minimum environmental 
standards are a form of economic protectionism, and are locally 
 
Pashigian’s study of the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration Program. See B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental 
Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 Econ. 
Inquiry 551 (1985) (discussing the self-interest hypothesis and other 
hypotheses to explain votes on the PSD policy). I discuss the 
distributional politics of the PSD program infra text at notes 237–238. 
28. Work in empirical political science that has looked at legislative role call 
voting (as opposed to various indices of legislative positions on 
particular issues) has found that constituent preferences explain a large 
and increasing fraction of such votes: that is, legislators from geographic 
districts represent the preferences of their constituents on virtually all 
important legislation. See James M. Snyder Jr., Constituency 
Preferences: California Ballot Propositions, 1974–90, 21 Legis. Stud. 
Q. 463, 477–81 (1996) (finding constituency preferences are better than 
party preferences for predicting votes on public goods and regulation 
issues).  
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counter-majoritarian, in that they override median voter preferences 
in lesser-developed jurisdictions. Still, the Clean Air Act succeeded 
because representatives from older, dirtier parts of the country were a 
majority in Congress.  
The Clean Water Act was another successful attempt at 
environmental federalization. Unlike the Clean Air Act—key 
provisions of which were opposed by members of Congress from newer 
and cleaner states—the Clean Water Act’s key provisions—creating a 
federal subsidy for new and improved local sewer systems—received 
universal Congressional support. Those subsidies were a form of 
political pork, representing a transfer from residents of less 
industrialized localities to cities that had already developed or which 
were more rapidly developing polluting industries.  
Finally, the history of failed Congressional attempts to enact a 
federal climate change statute clearly illustrates how when states have 
diverged significantly—in the case of climate change, in their 
predominant energy source for electricity generation and therefore 
level of carbon-dioxide emissions—the variation may be so great as to 
preclude any general federal regulatory statute from being enacted.  
A. American Regional Economic Development, 
and Environmental Regulation, Circa 1970 
1. The Undeveloped, Unpolluted and Accessible South and West 
One of the most remarkable features of American legal scholarship 
about federalism is the certainty with which scholars assert that the 
United States is really just one big vast homogeneous blob, with few if 
any significant regional differences.29 However debatable today, this 
belief was simply incorrect for most of the twentieth century. By 
1970, the United States looked very much like a simple two-
jurisdiction world with one jurisdiction very highly developed and 
environmentally degraded, the other relatively little developed with a 
vast supply of pristine (and cheap) natural resources, and with the 
two jurisdictions finally linked by a new, very low cost means of mass 
transportation, the interstate highway system.  
Legal scholars seem to forget how much America changed after 
World War II. Over the period 1939–1964, total U.S. manufacturing 
employment increased by sixty-nine percent, and even in 1953—after 
Japan and Europe were well along the route to recovering from the 
destruction of World War II—the United States accounted for fifty 
percent of the world’s manufacturing production.30 Although the 
 
29. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 944 (1994) (distinguishing 
the individual states in the United States from Catalonia in Spain). 
30. Paul Bairoch, International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980, 
11. J. Euro. Econ. Hist. 269, 299 (1982). 
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largest percentage increases in manufacturing employment during this 
period occurred in Texas, California, and Florida,31 the largest 
absolute increases were concentrated in the region stretching from 
New York, across Pennsylvania, to the Great Lakes states.32 
Along with a massive increase in the level of manufacturing came 
a change in its location. Unprecedented migration decreased farm 
population from thirty million people, or twenty-three percent of the 
national population, in 1940, to roughly ten million people, or less 
than five percent of the national population in 1970.33 This migration 
was primarily from the farm to the suburb. A 1946–47 Bureau of 
Labor Statistics report found that in the six metropolitan regions 
surveyed, suburbs accounted for sixty-two percent of construction 
while the national suburban growth rate was ten times that of central 
cities by 1950.34 Manufacturing, which even in the early twentieth 
century had been concentrated in urban areas proximate to rail lines 
and/or shipping ports,35 became increasingly dispersed. By 1963, 
industrial employment was more than half suburban-based, and by 
1981, two-thirds of all manufacturing activity took place in suburban 
industrial parks of the suburbs.36  
As late as 1965, American industrial growth was concentrated in 
newer suburban areas in the old industrial heartland of the country, 
the upper Midwest and Northeast. The Southern and Western regions 
of the country remained relatively undeveloped. Between 1940 and 
1960, population density increased in every part of the country, but 
by far the largest increases in density were in the developed Northeast 
and Midwest. Aside from Florida, Georgia, and Texas, the Southern 
states had small absolute increases in density, and some states, such 
as West Virginia and Mississippi actually lost population.37 Even 
 
31. See Gunnar Alexandersson, Geography of Manufacturing 24 
(1967) (with increases of, respectively, 268, 192, and 225%). 
32. Id. These states thus increased what had been position of regional 
dominance in manufacturing; as late as 1937, seventy-two percent of all 
manufacturing in the United States came from the seventeen 
Northeastern and Midwestern states. Bernard L. Weinstein & 
Robert F. Firestine, Regional Growth and Decline in the 
United States: The Rise of the Sunbelt State and the Decline 
of the Northeast 58 (1978). 
33. David B. Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural 
America 245 (2d ed. 2006). 
34. Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization 
of the United States 238 (1985). 
35. Id. at 113.  
36. Id. at 267.  
37. U.S. Census Bureau, Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States: 1981, at 10–11 tbl.9 (1981). 
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though inland Western states added postwar population at a 
tremendous rate, they remained far less densely developed than the 
older Northeastern and Midwestern states.38 As late as 1970, when the 
population of every Northeastern and Midwestern state was heavily 
concentrated in urban versus rural areas, many Southern states had 
as many or more people living in rural areas than in urban areas.39  
The South is especially important in understanding regional 
development patterns as they existed around 1970.40 With the 
exception of Florida and Texas, southern manufacturing employment 
was concentrated in labor-intensive, low wage industries. Indeed, even 
in 1977, one of the dominant Southern industries, apparel, paid the 
lowest hourly wage of any of the SIC two-digit industry categories 
(another regionally important industry, textile, was third lowest at 
$4.07).41 In the South, such low wage industries were the norm, not 
the exception. Importantly, throughout the early post-war period, 
Southern wages and incomes continued the long historical pattern of 
lagging far behind national averages.42 In areas where low wage 
industries such as textiles and lumber dominated—as in east 
Tennessee—wage differentials between Southern and Northern 
workers were actually increasing: in eighteen east Tennessee counties, 
“average annual wages fell from eighty to seventy-seven percent of the 
national average between 1958 and 1963.”43  
 
38. In 1960, for instance, the most densely developed mountain states of 
Colorado and Arizona had population densities of only approximately 
seventeen and eleven persons per square mile, respectively, while the 
least developed Rust Belt states of Wisconsin and Indiana stood at 
seventy-three and 180 persons per square mile. Id. 
39. In 1970, both North and South Carolina had more rural than urban 
residents. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1970, Part I, at 32, 35 (Bicentennial ed., 1975). 
40. The great surge in Western economic development did not occur until 
the 1990s, and in many ways, Western economic development differs 
from Southern economic development. The inland West has traditionally 
had a heavy concentration of immobile extractive industries such as 
mining and timber, and the coastal West developed virtually as a 
separate economic market centered around California until well after 
World War II. See Carol E. Heim, Structural Changes: Regional and 
Urban, in III The Cambridge Economic History of the United 
States: The Twentieth Century 93, 99–100, 127–28, 154–55 
(Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 2000).  
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 114–15. 
43. James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern 
Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936–1990, at 114 (2d ed. 
1993). 
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Despite its advantages in attracting labor-intensive industry, the 
South actually lost population throughout the 1950s and 1960s. By 
the early 1970s, however, these trends were in the process of dramatic 
reversal. The economies of the Southern states had begun the famous 
“sunbelt” take off. These states had a net gain from migration of 2.9 
million between 1970 and 1976,44 and during the early 1970s, grew by 
5.1 million persons, more than the rest of the country combined (with 
more than one and one half times as many migrants as even the 
rapidly growing West).45 The extent of the regional redistribution is 
demonstrated by the fact that between 1967 and 1977, the New 
England, mid-Atlantic, and Great Lakes states all lost manufacturing 
jobs, with New York and Pennsylvania experiencing declines of more 
than fifteen percent. During that same period, the Southwest and 
Mountain states all saw manufacturing employment increase by more 
than fifteen percent, and manufacturing continued to shift to Texas, 
Florida, and California, despite already high levels.46 During the 
1970s, Texas alone added more non-farm jobs than Michigan, Illinois, 
Ohio, and Massachusetts combined.47 Between 1970 and 1975, every 
southern industry except mining grew faster than the national 
average.48 
On the one hand, because it was relatively undeveloped, the 
South offered industries cheap land, labor and raw materials. 
Southern states and localities aggressively marketed their abundant 
and largely unused supply of water and land, a message conveyed by 
an Orlando, Florida advertisement captioning a healthy orange with 
the assurance that “there’s profitable growing room in Orlando.”49 
Petrochemical companies consistently identified the existence of raw 
materials and cheap barge transportation for access to foreign markets 
as the key reason for opening new operations in the South and 
Southwest.50 In 1969, for instance, BASF announced that it had 
chosen to locate a new $100 million petrochemical plant in Beaufort,  
44. Id. at 188. 
45. Weinstein & Firestine, supra note 32, at 3. 
46. H.D. Watts, Industrial Geography 4 fig.1.3 (1987). 
47. James C. Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877–
1984, at 57 (1984). 
48. Cobb, supra note 43, at 188; Weinstein & Firestine, supra note 32, 
at 5. The South received more than half of all new manufacturing jobs 
created between 1962 and 1978, and although manufacturing 
decentralized to suburban rings in the South and West, unlike their 
Northern counterparts, Southern and Western cities actually gained 
manufacturing jobs in their central cities between 1947 and 1972. Heim, 
supra note 40, at 155. 
49. Cobb, supra note 43, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50. Id. at 213. 
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South Carolina, because Beaufort offered both cheap land (1800 acres, 
much of it state-owned) and the five million gallons of fresh water 
that the plant would need each day.51 
The same was true in the pulp and paper industry. After World 
War II, pulp and paper production in the Southeastern states 
skyrocketed, increasing from 2.7 million cords in 1939 to 7.7 million 
cords in 1951, and by 1956 had almost overtaken cotton growing as 
the most important Southern industry.52 As one industry observer 
explained:  
The whole thing boils down pretty much to wood supply and 
the costs involved. . . . The South can’t be beaten 
now. . . . [T]he motorized small saws work like a charm, 
and . . . the country is so flat that [the mills] can be moved 
about. The saws will work in the north too, but here production 
per man can never be so great as in the South because of the 
more difficult terrain. The same thing is going to hurt the West 
in second growth, too.53  
More generally, as the Japanese consul general in Atlanta explained, 
“[o]lder industries like textiles are being phased out in Japan and 
exported to other countries. . . . We will put these high-pollution 
industries where there is space and water enough to handle 
them . . . like here in the South.”54 
Even given the huge differences in the cost of land, labor and 
energy, the late 1960s incentive for industrial relocation to the 
relatively undeveloped Southern and Western regions of the United 
States would not have been nearly as strong were it not for the 
interstate highway system. Authorized in 1956 at an original price tag 
of twenty-six billion dollars (ninety percent of which would be paid by 
the federal government), by the early 1970s the 41,000 mile Interstate 
system was finally nearing completion.55 The Interstate system 
completely altered industrial transportation cost structure. Small 
towns that had been far from rail heads got freeway interchanges and 
became for the first time truly part of the interstate and international 
market. The trucking industry exploded, with goods shipped by truck 
 
51. Id. at 240. 
52. David C. Smith, History of Papermaking in the United States 
(1691–1969) 419 (1971).  
53. Id. at 549 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54. Cobb, supra note 43, at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55. On the ultimately successful political battle for the interstate system, 
see generally Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway 
Politics, 1939–1989, at 69–100 (rev. ed. 1990) (discussing the political 
battle to create American highways during the Eisenhower era). 
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increasing by 257% between 1955 and 1990.56 By 1970, it had become 
possible to ship goods five hundred miles overnight by truck, and over 
fifty percent of truck traffic was on the interstates.57 The 
transportation revolution brought by the Interstate had a dramatic 
effect on development patterns and population distribution. During 
the 1950s, a net of five million people left non-metropolitan areas, a 
trend that was especially pronounced in the South, where the 
mechanization of cotton harvesting and the consequent end of the 
sharecropper system generated a huge migration to Northern cities of 
the rural poor.58 Outmigration from rural areas began to diminish 
during the 1960s, but it was not until the 1970–1973 period that 
population growth in rural counties actually exceeded the growth in 
urban and suburban counties.59 For the first time in the twentieth 
century, population in rural areas lying outside Census-defined 
metropolitan areas grew faster than population in metro areas.60 
Significantly, the greatest shift in population trends occurred in the 
most rural counties, those that were adjacent to metropolitan areas.61 
Economic incentives for industrial relocation were not the only 
force driving the accelerating development of the Southern and 
Western United States. By the late 1960s, the United States had 
achieved an unprecedented level of mass affluence. Affluence vastly 
increased the demand for local environmental quality and distant 
undeveloped natural resources. The ninety-one percent growth in 
population in the Western states over the 1950–1976 period was the 
largest for any region of the country.62 In Florida (whose 1970s 
population increase of 1.6 million was bigger than the growth of the 
twenty-one Northeastern and North-central rust-belt states 
combined)63 growth was fueled initially by tourism, aerospace, and the 
relocation of northern retirees.64 With rapidly increasing energy and 
commodity prices, the cost of living advantage of Sunbelt states 
 
56. Tom Lewis, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate 
Highways, Transforming American Life 286 (Cornell Paperbacks 
2013) (1997). 
57. Id. at 286–87. 
58. Calvin L. Beale, Econ. Res. Serv. ERS-605, The Revival of 
Population Growth in Nonmetropolitan America 4 (1975).  
59. Id. at 6. 
60. Id. Urban centers with more than fifty-thousand people were considered 
metro areas. Id. at 6 n.2.  
61. Id. at 7. 
62. Weinstein & Firestine, supra note 32, at 3 tbl.1.1. 
63. Cobb, supra note 47, at 55. 
64. Id. at 53–56. 
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became even larger than its already large historical level.65 While 
inherently difficult to measure, surveys around this time consistently 
showed that the “amenities [quality of life] of the rapidly growing 
southern and western regions—less environmental degradation, lower 
population densities, more moderate climates, ease of transportation, 
access to recreational activities, lower crime rates” were a major 
attraction both to a burgeoning retirement-age population and 
younger families.66 
These stylized facts are crucial in understanding the forces behind 
environmental federalization in the United States. Federal 
environmental legislation was passed just as the great takeoff in 
Southern and Western economic development was beginning, years 
before increases in wealth, income and development increased the 
demand for local environmental amenities there. As historian James 
Cobb observes, even in the 1970s, there remained in the South 
“sparsely populated rural areas where industrial activity was at a 
minimum. Pollution hardly seemed a problem in such locales where 
citizens were considerably more interested in jobs and a better 
standard of living than in the pristine quality of air and water, which 
they took for granted.”67 Employers, employees, and retirees were all 
racing south and west during the late 1960s, but they were doing so 
because the Southern and Western states offered a low cost, relatively 
pristine and undeveloped natural environment. Even as Environ-
mentalism gathered federal momentum, the Southern states continued 
to furiously compete for capital by exempting new industry from state 
and local taxes68 and remained more interested in recruiting industry 
than in cleaning up the environment.69  
The Southern and Western states were competing to attract 
business through tax breaks, but they were not caught in some kind 
of downward regulatory spiral. Indeed, as development in the West 
and South caught up with development in the Northeast and 
Midwest, the demand for environmental quality and resource 
preservation grew also. For instance, Southern states made up twelve 
of the top twenty-five states in the National Wildlife Federation’s 
 
65. Id. at 56–57. 
66. Bernard L. Weinstein & John Rees, Sunbelt/Frostbelt Confrontation?, in 
Plant Closings: Public or Private Choices? 193, 200–01 (Richard 
B. McKenzie ed., rev. ed. 1984). 
67. Cobb, supra note 43, at 243. 
68. Indeed, five of the seven most aggressive states in granting such 
exemptions were located in the South, and by the mid-1960s, Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana were offering ten-year exemptions on all state 
and local taxes, while South Carolina and Kentucky were offering five-
year exemptions on local taxes. Id. at 48. 
69. Id. at 238. 
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1979 ranking of state hazardous waste regulatory stringency.70 The 
most significant variable explaining the variation across the states in 
the intensity of state hazardous waste regulation was the level of state 
industrialization.71 
Work by Arik Levinson provides even more compelling evidence 
for the model of anticompetitive federal mandates.72 Commerce 
Department data on industry pollution abatement costs are a widely 
used measure of state environmental compliance costs and regulatory 
stringency. Levinson found that the ranking of state environmental 
regulatory stringency over the 1977–1994 period changed radically 
when abatement cost data were adjusted to control for the pollution 
intensivity of each industry. Given their concentration of heavy 
polluting industry, rust-belt states such as Delaware, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio were much more lenient than the raw 
abatement cost numbers would imply. By the same token, Western 
clean-industry states—such as Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, 
and Oregon—had very stringent environmental standards.73  
2. The Environmental Kuznets Curve Confirmed: Development and 
the Demand for Local Environmental Protection in Older America 
 
Throughout history, wealth accumulated from early development 
has increased leisure time and stimulated a new sort of demand 
among residents of developed communities jurisdiction: the demand 
for natural recreational opportunities and for a cleaner local 
environment.74 While there are a variety of factors that explain local 
demand for environmental quality,75 there is now strong empirical 
 
70. See James P. Lester et. al., Hazardous Wastes, Politics, and Public 
Policy: A Comparative State Analysis, 36 W. Pol. Q. 257, 268 tbl.1 
(1983). 
71. Id. at 269 tbl.2. 
72. Arik Levinson, An Industry-Adjusted Index of State Environmental 
Compliance Costs, in Behavioral and Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Policy 131 (Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf eds., 
2001).  
73. Id. at 134–39. 
74. For a general discussion, see John Towner, An Historical 
Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World, 
1540–1940 (1996) (discussing the roles of recreation and tourism on 
land use across time and place), and on the America “city beautiful” 
movement, an early twentieth century manifestation of this 
phenomenon, see Martin V. Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: 
Refuse, Reform, and the Environment, 1880–1980, at 110–12 
(1981). 
75. For an early discussion of which factors seem to explain environmental 
preferences, see Kent D. Van Liere & Riley E. Dunlap, The Social Bases 
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evidence that as wealth and income increase, so too does a person’s 
demand for local environmental quality.76 At the country level, there 
has been repeated confirmation of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between a country’s per capita income and its environmental 
quality:77 as national income increases, the level of conventional 
pollutants increases, but then, as income continues to increase, 
pollution falls. While there are clearly both demand and supply 
(technological) considerations at work in causing this relationship, its 
existence is well established.78  
 
of Environmental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations and 
Empirical Evidence, 44 Pub. Op. Q. 181 (1980).  
76. For empirical evidence supporting this assumption, see Robert Deacon 
& Perry Shapiro, Private Preference for Collective Goods Revealed 
Through Voting on Referenda, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 943 (1975) (finding 
that income, along with occupation, political preference, education, and 
location, was an important factor in voting for environmental equality); 
Mary E. Deily & Wayne B. Gray, Enforcement of Pollution Regulations 
in a Declining Industry, 21 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 260, 267–69 
(1991) (determining that EPA enforcement is less likely as the plant 
employs more of the community and enforcement increases the risk of 
plant closure by more than ten percent); William A. Fischel, 
Determinants of Voting on Environmental Quality: A Study of New 
Hampshire Pulp Mill Referendum, 6 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 107, 
115 (1979) (using a survey of individual voter responses to find “income, 
occupation, and education are rather robust determinants of preferences 
about environmental equality”); Matthew E. Kahn & John G. 
Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting 
Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1997) (finding 
demand for environmental goods increases with income except for the 
demand from the highest income levels). 
77. There has been repeated confirmation of the observation that the level 
of some important pollutants follows an inverted U-shaped pattern 
relative to national per capita income. See, e.g., Sander M. de Bruyn, 
Economic Growth and the Environment: An Empirical 
Analysis 77–98 (2000); Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Kreuger, 
Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.J. Econ. 353 (1995); 
F.G. Hank Hilton & Arik Levinson, Factoring the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve: Evidence from Automotive Lead Emissions, 35 J. 
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 126, 136 fig.3 (1998); Thomas M. Selden & 
Daqing Song, Environmental Quality and Development: Is There a 
Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?, 27 J. Envtl. Econ. & 
Mgmt. 147 (1994); Thomas M. Seldon & Daqing Song, Neoclassical 
Growth, the J Curve for Abatement, and the Inverted U Curve for 
Pollution, 29 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 162, 165–67 (1995). 
78. For the general notion that the more or less natural process of national 
economic growth involves a progression from clean self-sustaining 
economies through dirty industrialization to a clean post-industrial 
stage, see Kenneth Arrow et al., Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, 
and the Environment, 268 Science 520 (1995). James Andreoni and 
Arik Levinson showed that when there are economies of scale in abating 
pollution generated as an undesirable by-product of producing private 
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B. Air Pollution Circa 1970: Effective State and Local Regulation 
The environmental Kuznets curve suggests that the radically 
different levels of economic development and environmental 
degradation in various American regions circa 1970 should have led to 
radically different levels of demand for environmental regulation. As 
of 1970, the majority of states did not even have a generalized air 
pollution problem for which a comprehensive state program made 
sense.79 But, crucially, those states that did have a problem were 
doing something about it. 
1. Effective Local Regulation to Curb the Black 
Carbon (Coal Smoke) Problem 
During the early twentieth century, the major air pollution 
problem confronting large American cities was the smoke from coal 
burned in residential and industrial uses. The problem appeared in 
those cities that relied upon dirty bituminous coal, such as St. Louis 
(which burned cheap but highly impure coal mined from southern 
Illinois)80 and Pittsburgh (burning local southwestern Pennsylvania 
coal).81 Thirty or forty years ago, historians and political scientists 
were quick to conclude that these cities had very little success in 
dealing with their smoke problem.82  
More recent work reveals to the contrary a history of active and 
ultimately effective local regulation to reduce smoke.83 Antismoke 
activism in cities such as Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, St. Louis, 
 
consumption goods, increases in income will alone eventually generate a 
demand for higher levels of abatement and less pollution. James 
Andreoni & Arik Levinson, The Simple Analytics of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve, 80 J. Pub. Econ. 269, 279–81 (2001). Still there 
remains some dispute in the literature as to the theoretical explanation 
for why the environmental Kuznets curve exists. For a survey, see 
Masaski Kijima, Katsumasa Nishide & Atsuyuki Ohyama, Economic 
Models for the Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Survey, 34 J. Econ. 
Dynamics & Control 1187 (2010). 
79. This is clearly demonstrated by Indur Goklany, Clearing the Air: 
The Real Story of the War on Air Pollution 27–29 (1999).  
80. R. Dale Grinder, The Battle for Clean Air: The Smoke Problem in Post-
Civil War America, in Pollution and Reform in American Cities, 
1870–1930, at 83, 100–01 (Martin V. Melosi ed., 1980).  
81. Charles O. Jones, Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of 
Pollution Control 22 (1975). 
82. See, e.g., J. Clarence Davies III, The Politics of Pollution 128 
(1970); Jones, supra note 81, at 23–35; Grinder, supra note 80, at 100–
01. 
83. See generally David Stradling, Smokestacks and Progressives: 
Environmentalists, Engineers, and Air Quality in America, 
1881–1951 (1999). 
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and Pittsburgh was a constant during the early twentieth century.84 
By the mid-twentieth century, such local activism had produced clear 
positive results. Despite continuing opposition from the producers of 
high sulfur (or soft) coal, by 1946, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and 
Cincinnati had all passed ordinances requiring the use of either clean 
(low sulfur and fly ash) coal or mechanical stokers.85 Studies by 
independent bodies showed that the ordinances produced dramatic 
reductions in soot fall (Cincinnati)86 and periods of thick smoke (St. 
Louis).87 Even in cities where lobbying and public relations efforts by 
soft coal producers and coal-bearing railroads kept high-volatile coal 
(soft coal) in use in a number of cities (such as Cleveland, 
Philadelphia, and Providence),88 smoke was eventually made subject 
to local regulation.89 More municipalities passed air-pollution-control 
ordinances during the 1940s than during any other decade between 
1880 and 1980.90 Along with a shift away from coal and toward other 
heating fuels, such as oil and natural gas, by the early 1950s, local 
regulation had effectively ended the problem of smoke pollution in 
American cities.91 
A constant theme in local efforts to curb the smoke problem was 
the race-to-the-top rationale. Reacting to a large increase in soot 
between 1936 and 1947 as a consequence of its shift from bituminous 
to anthracite coal, New York City activists and political leaders 
argued in the late 1940s that New York should not be left behind 
Pittsburgh and St. Louis.92 Arguments in Pittsburgh centered not 
only around smoke’s health and cleanliness effects, but also how these 
led to the residential exodus to the suburbs.93 Rather than competing 
to cut smoke regulation, cities hurried to match the dramatic 
reductions achieved elsewhere. 
 
84. Id. at 37–151. 
85. Id. at 163–75. 
86. The Smoke Abatement League found that during the first eight years of 
Cincinnati’s ordinance restricting high-volatile coal, there was fifty 
percent less soot fall in Cincinnati. Id. at 175. 
87. See id. at 167 (reporting an 83.5% reduction in hours of thick smoke 
from the previous year in St. Louis). 
88. Id. at 174.  
89. See id. at 179–80 (noting Cleveland’s decision to reorganize its 
regulators and to form the Division of Air Pollution Control in lieu of 
adopting new regulations). 
90. Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United 
States, 32 J. Air Pollution Control Ass’n. 44, 47 (1982). 
91. See Goklany, supra note 79, at 21.  
92. Stradling, supra note 83, at 178. 
93. Id. at 169. 
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2. State and Local Responses to Sulfur Dioxide and Smog Pollution 
By the 1950s, the air pollution problem was perceived not as 
smoke but “smog.” By the end of the 1940s, journalistic accounts 
increasingly portrayed the health effects of chemical fumes as problem 
with national scope, from the “nauseating gases” from the San 
Francisco bay area oil refineries to the “sickening odor of oil or gas” 
in New Orleans.94 A highly publicized incident of toxic smog on 
Halloween, 1948 in Donora, Pennsylvania, that left nineteen people 
dead from asphyxiation was ascribed to emissions from a local zinc 
smelting plant.95  
Cities and localities reacted to the new industrial air pollution 
problem in ways that were rational and, given the state of knowledge 
regarding the various causes of air pollution, relatively effective. The 
fact that air pollution spilled over across the separate political 
jurisdictions making up industrial metropolitan areas was clearly 
recognized by local government, and by 1965, half of all local air 
control programs had jurisdiction over an entire county or several 
counties.96 Moreover, recognizing that the urban air pollution problem 
was a health problem, over eighty percent of the local air pollution 
control agencies created between 1961 and 1965 were placed within 
health departments.97 During the 1960s, a number of cities and 
counties enacted stringent air pollution emissions ordinances.98 And, 
as was often the case, when highly developed urban population 
centers within a state that had acted locally to control pollution also 
had majoritarian control at the centralized (state level), they pushed 
for state standards to complement local regulations. In Pennsylvania, 
for instance, the state Air Pollution Control Commission, chaired by a 
Bethlehem Steel official, recommended a very lax state sulfur dioxide 
standard of 100 μg/m3. Public meetings in Pittsburgh and 
Philadelphia generated widespread public support for a stricter 
standard; support also came from the United Steelworkers, the 
congressman from the Pittsburgh steel area, and the governor of 
Pennsylvania.99 In New York City, the adverse health effects of sulfur 
dioxide emissions from coal combustion led the City Council in 1965 
 
94. Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95. Lynne Page Snyder, “The Death-Dealing Smog Over Donora, 
Pennsylvania”: Industrial Air Pollution, Public Health, and Federal 
Policy, 1915–1963, at 20–30 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania). 
96. Davies, supra note 82, at 128. 
97. Id. 
98. Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Environmental Administration, in 
Explorations in Environmental History 418, 438–39 (1998). 
99. Id. at 439. 
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to pass an ordinance with a five-year schedule for reducing sulfur 
emissions.100 The next year, the states of New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut all announced a plan to combat air 
pollution from coal.101 In 1967, the Secretary of HEW reported that 
virtually all American cities had unhealthy levels of sulfur dioxide and 
recommended reducing reliance on soft coal.102 The threat of 
increasingly strict regulation in the older, developed Northeastern 
states caused the coal industry coalition—especially coal users—to 
revise their traditional opposition to federal regulation. As Fred 
Tucker, manager of pollution control services for National Steel 
Corporation complained in Congressional testimony, “people . . . 
appear to be playing a numbers game with [state] air quality 
standards, by setting lower and lower allowable pollutant levels in 
state standards.”103 
Smog caused by lower tropospheric ozone, had first become a 
headline problem with several notorious incidents during the 1940s in 
the Los Angeles basin.104 By 1959, California had not only funded the 
research that identified automobile emissions as the cause of smog, it 
had also passed a statute regulating such automobile emissions.105 
During the 1940s and 1950s, however, smog was a problem confined 
to California and a few other major American metropolitan areas.106 
Although the entire California delegation pressed annually for federal 
legislation to deal with automobile exhaust emissions, they did not 
succeed until the 1960s, by which time the smog problem had spread 
to a number of other major metropolitan areas.107  
 
100. Richard H.K. Vietor, Environmental Politics and the Coal 
Coalition 138–40 (1980). 
101. Christopher J. Bailey, Congress and Air Pollution: 
Environmental Policies in the USA 129 (1998). 
102. Id. 
103. Hays, supra note 98, at 567 n.94. 
104. Most notorious of all was the “daylight dimout” of September 8, 1943, 
when “[t]housands of eyes smarted, many wept, sneezed and 
coughed[ and] [t]hroughout the downtown area and into the foothills the 
fumes spread their irritation.” James E. Krier & Edmund Ursin, 
Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California and 
Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution 1940–
1974, at 53 (1977) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
105. Id. at 127–32. 
106. Bailey, supra note 101, at 86–89. 
107. Id. at 89–108. 
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C.  How Development Created Local Demand for Pollution Reduction: 
The Postwar Water Pollution Story 
By the late 1960s, postwar economic development had had the 
ironic effect of both generating some infamously polluted waterways 
and creating economically affluent citizens who wanted to use those 
waterways for leisure time pursuits such as fishing and boating. In 
addition, given the importance of clean water as an input in the 
production process, heavily polluted rivers stood as an obstacle to 
further local industrial development. Thus by 1970, in industrialized 
localities, there was both a problem—polluted waterways—and multi-
pronged demand for cleanup on the part of both producers of private 
goods and would-be consumers of the local public good of clean water. 
This Part recounts those developments. 
By the late 1960s, the Great Lakes and Northeastern regions, with 
old industrial facilities that had been operating near capacity for two 
decades, and old wastewater and water treatment plants, suffered 
most acutely, and most visibly from water pollution. It was, after all, 
the burning Cuyahoga River in Cleveland that made the front page of 
the New York Times as the cover story dramatizing the nation’s 
water pollution woes.108 In the Southeast, paper mills had become a 
major industrial presence and a serious pollution problem.109 Coal, 
steel, and other industrial raw materials were transported along 
Eastern and Midwestern rivers; major oil refineries were concentrated 
in that region of the country as well. 
Matters were far different west of the Mississippi. In the arid 
West, water quantity and fears of water shortage have always been a 
much greater concern than water quality. What water quality issues 
existed in the West centered around the effect of alternative timber 
harvest and grazing practices on runoff.110 Prior to the federal 
reclamation movement, major Western rivers were far too 
unreliable—flooding in the spring, and drying up in the summer—to 
be useful for navigation and commerce. As a consequence, for the 
most part, the largest Western cities are not located on major rivers. 
In the late 1960s, few if any Western cities had water treatment 
problems.  
108. The burning of the Cuyahoga, used as an example of the need for 
federal action, was especially ironic, for as observed by Jonathan H. 
Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of 
Environmental Protection, 14 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 89, 108 (2002), 
local voters had already approved spending over $100 million to clean 
up the Cuyahoga. In fact, the Cuyahoga story illustrates the point made 
here: in heavily industrialized and polluted localities, citizens were 
already approving costly local action to reduce pollution.  
109. Susan Hunter & Richard W. Waterman, Enforcing the Law: 
The Case of the Clean Water Acts 15, 20–21 (1996). 
110. To a substantial degree, this remains true today. See id. at 16–18. 
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1. Subsidies and the Demand for Clean Water: The Maine Example 
East of the Mississippi, water pollution had become a serious 
obstacle to further economic growth. A wonderful illustration of the 
Eastern dilemma is provided by the state of Maine.111 By the 1920s, 
there were “thirty-seven pulp and paper mills, eighty textile mills, and 
eleven tanneries . . . dumping thousands of tons of tanning liquors, 
sulfite, bleach, dye, and . . . wood fiber into [Maine] rivers . . . .”112 
Post–World War II economic expansion meant higher levels of 
pollution than ever before, and in 1941 pollution along the 
Androscoggin Valley became so severe that a group of fifty-two 
Lewiston businessmen organized and petitioned the State Legislature 
for action to halt sulfite dumping by upstream paper mills and 
tanneries. According to environmental historian Richard Judd:  
Their complaints were primarily economic: pollution threatened 
rental, commercial, and agricultural property along the river; 
caustic fumes discolored buildings and tarnished and etched 
displays of kitchenware and jewelry; and the stench distracted 
and debilitated people working near the river, undermined pride 
in the community, damaged the town’s commercial reputation, 
and devastated the local tourist trade.113 
During the 1950s, however, cities such as Lewiston realized that the 
city’s economic interest in water pollution control was ambiguous. 
Upstream pollution had actually limited the city’s ability to attract 
similar industrial users because it cut the supply of industrial grade 
soft water (a production input) and the stench made the city 
unattractive for industries that might have diversified its economic 
base.114 But as grassroots concern with water pollution mounted 
during the early 1950s, cities themselves became targets, for their 
universal practice was to dump raw sewage into rivers. The cities 
argued that wastewater treatment would be wasted without pollution 
control by upstream mills.115 But the textile industry was in the 
process of moving to the South, and competition from Southern mills 
began to create excess capacity in the generally healthy pulp and 
paper industry. Manufacturing employment in Maine fell by 6600 
persons in the year 1954 alone.116   
111. The following account is drawn entirely from Richard W. Judd, The 
Coming of the Clean Waters Acts in Maine, 1941–1961, 14 Envtl. 
Hist. Rev. 50 (1990). 
112. Id. at 53.  
113. Id. at 54. 
114. Id. at 57.  
115. Id. at 59.  
116. Id. at 60. 
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It was in this climate that Edmund Muskie became governor in 
1953. For the next four years, his administration championed New 
Deal–style statewide economic redevelopment.117 Muskie recognized 
that clean water would provide an “inducement for industries to 
locate in this State,” but he nonetheless expedited approval of permits 
for a new tannery after being assured by residents that the river was 
already so bad that another factory would be worth far more in jobs 
than it would cost in additional pollution.118 By 1955, water pollution 
was a dominant issue in the State legislature, and by 1957 the 
legislature had before it a proposed water quality classification of  
over twelve thousand miles of rivers and coastal waters and four 
hundred individual recommendations for streams or sections of 
streams.119 Following industry and the Maine Municipal Association’s 
objections to the classifications, a redraft from the Natural Resources 
Committee lowered the classifications, in many cases below existing  
stream quality.120 
The problem was not that Maine political leaders were interested 
in further weakening regulation, and degrading water quality, as a 
way to attract industry. As Governor, Muskie perceived that the 
national problem was precisely the opposite, that industries were 
“racing to locate at the dwindling number of sites along our major 
water bodies . . . where large volumes of satisfactory water can still be 
secure without excessive expense for treatment.”121 Moreover, with the 
advent of the interstate highway system, the benefits of clean water 
for Maine’s burgeoning tourist industry were increasingly appreciated 
by Muskie and other state political leaders.122 
That both existing industry and Maine municipalities so strongly 
opposed water pollution regulation is explained not by their 
unwillingness to invest in water treatment, but rather by the 
investments they had already made. As a Maine Department of 
Development official aptly described the dilemma: 
Every industry . . . would dearly like clean water to use, but by 
agreement among them each mill, plant, and factory spends 
money to purify the water it uses and adds its wastes to the 
pollution of our streams and rivers when it would cost no more 
to build disposal plants to keep waste out of the water . . . [T]he 
problem of attracting any industry needing clean water in its 
 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 61 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119. Id. at 62–63.  
120. Id. at 63. 
121. Id. at 63–64. 
122. Id. at 64. 
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process to the State of Maine is obviously doubled if that 
industry must make arrangements for a water purification 
system before it can start operation.123 
In the late 1950s, two developments broke the stalemate in Maine 
state–water pollution law. Postwar affluence and enhanced leisure 
made Maine’s relatively undeveloped state an asset rather than a 
liability as its forests and coastlines were discovered by a new 
generation of recreational users. Even more importantly, 1956 
Amendments to the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act allocated $500 
million over a ten-year period for community sewage facility 
construction on a thirty percent matching basis.124 This was sufficient 
inducement for small towns to begin sewage treatment construction 
programs.125 After being reelected in 1957, Muskie succeeded in 
getting the state legislature to follow with a state program under 
which the state would fund an additional twenty percent of the cost 
of sewage treatment construction, thus giving Maine towns a 
combined fifty percent state-federal subsidy. In 1959, both state and 
federal grants were increased.126 
The sewage treatment subsidy dramatically changed the state’s 
political landscape. Whereas the Maine Municipal Association had 
long been allied with industry in opposing water pollution regulation, 
it switched and became a very strong supporter of clean water and 
industrial controls.127 In 1961, reclassification of the heavily polluted 
Kennebec (to be suitable for recreational fishing and boating) met 
with hardly any opposition; significantly, political leaders from 
Augusta, traditional allies of industrial polluters upstream, supported 
the reclassification and were confident that the city “could manage 
treatment costs over the comfortable fifteen year time limit.”128 By 
1966, with the reclassification of the Penobscot and Androscoggin, the 
three largest rivers in the state had been reclassified to provide for 
fish restoration, recreation, industrial water supply and a seventy-
percent reduction in organic pollutants.129 
2. Effective State Action for Clean Water in the Rust Belt 
Admittedly, it was not water pollution problems in remote and 
sparsely populated Maine that made the headlines in the 1960s and 
 
123. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124. Id. at 65. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 65–66. 
127. Id. at 66.  
128. Id. at 67.  
129. Id. 
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1970s. But the political and economic story in Maine was functionally 
the same as in Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Detroit. The 
problems on the Androscoggin—old industries and old cities, each 
facing large costs of moving from a system based on cleaning up water 
before it was used to one in which wastewater was to be treated 
before being discharged—were the same as those found on the 
Calumet (carrying pollution from Gary, Indiana, factories), Delaware, 
Detroit, Hudson, and perhaps most infamously, Cuyahoga Rivers. 
The evidence from these watersheds is increasingly clear on two 
crucial points. First, state regulation preceded federal regulation, set 
the basic pattern for federal regulation, and continued even when 
federal regulations were weakened. Thus, there is no evidence of a 
race-to-the-bottom. Second, and even more significantly, these 
watersheds were cleaned up primarily because of large, centralized 
cleanup subsidies that helped finance the construction of new publicly 
owned wastewater treatment works.  
Any notion of a race-to-the-bottom is confounded by the clear 
history of successful state action in improving water quality. Consider 
two of the most notorious examples: the Delaware River and the 
Great Lakes. Up until World War II, most municipal wastes along the 
Delaware were discharged into that River with little or no 
treatment.130 Only twenty percent of the wastes from Camden and 
Philadelphia were treated (and then only at the primary level, by 
screening out large solids).131 Industrial pollution was also a problem; 
by 1941, over two hundred industries discharged ninety-thousand tons 
per year of solid and semisolid wastes either directly into the 
Delaware or through sewers.132 The level of noxious hydrogen sulfide 
gas generated as a byproduct of bacterial decomposition of the wastes 
discharged into the river was so great that during World War II, the 
metal used in assembling naval radar equipment corroded while on 
the assembly line, and “[s]teamship crews would quit after one night 
aboard, complaining of the foul-smelling gases.”133  
Little was done about Delaware’s pollution problems during 
World War II, when the basin was the major wartime shipbuilding 
center and the overriding concern was to keep production levels as 
 
130. Shad runs on the Delaware declined from fifteen million to five million 
pounds between 1896 and 1904, Bruce Stutz, Natural Lives—
Modern Times: People and Places of the Delaware River 200 
(1992), and by 1946, “the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service found twenty 
miles of the upper estuary anoxic from the surface to the bottom.” Id. 
at 201 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
131. Ruth Patrick et al., Surface Water Quality: Have the Laws 
Been Successful? 10 (1992). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 10–11. 
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high as possible. But progress had in fact already been made. Between 
1936 and 1942, the Interstate Commission on the Delaware River 
Basin (Incodel) had already successfully persuaded riverfront 
communities to spend more than ten million dollars to build sewage 
collection and treatment systems.134 In 1937, Pennsylvania passed the 
Clean Stream Law, which put industrial wastes under legal control.135 
After the conclusion of World War II, great progress was made in 
dealing with both municipal and industrial pollution. In 1946, 
Philadelphia initiated an eighty-million-dollar sewer improvement and 
treatment program, and by 1955, the city had opened two new 
(primary) treatment plants serving the southwest and southeast 
sections of the city.136 By 1961, seventy-one percent of industries in 
Pennsylvania treated their wastes before discharging them into rivers, 
versus only eight percent in 1941.137  
Similar improvements had occurred in the Great Lakes region. 
This area, later known as the “Rust Belt,” was the heart of postwar 
American industrial expansion, with value added by manufacture 
more than doubling in every major metropolitan area on the shores of 
the Great Lakes between 1947 and 1963.138 With this tremendous 
manufacturing expansion came both an increase in water pollution 
and a dramatic increase in demand for local water-based recreational 
activities.139 State water pollution control officials had made 
tremendous progress in reducing both municipal and industrial 
discharges during the 1950s. Between 1952 and 1957, Ohio doubled its 
statewide sewage treatment capacity, and in 1959, the Michigan 
Water Resources Commission reported that sewage from over ninety 
percent of the state’s population was treated before being discharged 
into waterways.140 Indiana state regulators stated that thirty-five of 
the thirty-seven industrial plants in the Calumet River Basin that 
discharged into Lake Michigan were providing adequate treatment for 
their wastes, while 132 of 198 industries discharging wastes into Lake 
Erie or its tributaries were classified as having adequate treatment.141  
By the 1960s, however, local newspapers in the urban centers of 
the lower Great Lakes had begun continuing and strident coverage of 
 
134. Id. at 10. 
135. Id. at 13. 
136. Id. at 11–13. 
137. Id. at 13. 
138. Terence Kehoe, Cleaning Up the Great Lakes: From 
Cooperation to Confrontation 45 (1997). 
139. Id. at 45–46.  
140. Id. at 44. 
141. Id. at 45.  
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the environmental apocalypse that was soon to befall local waters. In 
1962, the Detroit News warned that “the Great Lakes could become 
another Dead Sea,” while the Cleveland Plain Dealer’s two-day front-
page coverage of the Cuyahoga’s sorry state made that river into a 
national cause célèbre.142 Sunday newspaper supplements carried color 
photos of the worst cases of industrial pollution.143 For decades, the 
standard interpretation of this media outcry has been to conclude 
that the problems were indeed severe and the direct fault of state 
regulators who cared more about industry than about water quality.  
This is much too superficial. The most widely respected state 
regulators of this era, such as Michigan’s Loring Oeming, seemed 
quite clearly to be surprised by the rapid escalation in the public’s 
demand for water quality. In a paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the National Water Pollution Control Federation in 1963, Oeming 
observed that:  
[T]he public seems to be demanding a quality of water higher 
than that which is now accepted by pollution control authorities 
as providing adequate protection. . . . Aesthetic considerations 
[and the demand that] the very best obtainable in sanitary 
quality is none too good, can be expected to result in gradual 
elevation of present quality objectives.144  
Speaking before the same group in 1965, a longtime Illinois water 
quality official commented on the new federal approach: “Suddenly, 
the conservationist, the recreationist, the purist burst forth to 
dominate the scene and to take over to a large extent the 
administrative control of the federal program.”145 
The existing historical evidence suggests that at least some state 
regulators really were surprised by rapidly escalating demands for 
local regulatory action to reduce water pollution. For instance, after 
spending or appropriating well over one million dollars to develop 
Sterling State Park on Lake Erie, Michigan authorities were forced to 
close the beach in August 1961 because of water contamination.146 
This was the only public beach on Lake Erie in the state of Michigan, 
and its close proximity to I-75, the interstate highway between 
 
142. Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143. Id. 
144. Roy F. Weston, Frank J. Trelease, Leonard B. Dworsky & Loring F. 
Oeming, Water Quality Management—Legal, Technical, and 
Administrative Aspects, 36 J. Water Pollution Control Fed’n, 
1082, 1106 (1964). 
145. Kehoe, supra note 138, at 82 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Detroit and Toledo, had made it a prime local mass recreation spot, 
with park attendance increasing from roughly 100,000 in 1952 to more 
than 1.2 million in 1959.147 The same story took place in Cleveland 
and Chicago. The very prosperity that polluted local waters had also 
generated the affluence and leisure time that increased local 
recreational demand for those waters. In Cleveland, for instance, the 
first groups to cry that Lake Erie was dying were commercial and 
sport fishermen and local conservationists.148 The citizen leader of 
campaign to clean up Cleveland-area waters was an affluent Shaker 
Heights automobile dealer who was also an avid fisherman and 
boater.149 In Chicago, local newspapers focused on the oil 
contamination at Calumet Park Beach, with pictures of boat oars and 
swimmers coated with oil.150 
It is true that some Great Lakes pollution problems had an 
obvious interstate aspect—as in southern Lake Michigan, where 
wastes discharged from plants in Gary, Indiana, contaminated Illinois 
beaches.151 Still, in terms of the recreational user groups affected, all 
the major water pollution problems of the late 1960s Environmentalist 
era were intensely local. A 1963 federal study of Lake Michigan found 
that water quality in the main body of the Lake was “very high,” 
with only the southwest shoreline showing high coliform readings, 
excessive algae growth, and high phenol and ammonia levels.152 The 
beaches and waters adjacent to Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland were 
used by the residents of those cities, not by distant users from other 
parts of the United States or other countries. People who suffered the 
most harm from local pollution were also the beneficiaries of local 
development; indeed, they would not have had the wealth and leisure 
time for outdoor recreation without local development.  
III. Explaining Federalization: Centralized 
Environmental Regulation as Regional Economic 
Protectionism and Political Pork 
These summary histories of late twentieth-century state and local 
efforts to curb air and water pollution are stories of relative success, 
but they also depict how state and local environmental regulatory  
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 61. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 65. 
151. Id. The City of Chicago had long since reversed the direction of the 
Chicago River to carry its own effluent downstream, into the Illinois 
River system and ultimately to the Mississippi, where it became the 
problem of downstream cities such as St. Louis. 
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efforts were slowed by an appreciation of the cost of environmental 
improvement. What they reveal most dramatically, perhaps, is  
how widespread the perception was that cleaning up local 
environments could also hurt local economies. As I argue below, 
federalization of both air and water pollution control succeeded when 
a sufficiently large number of U.S. states had reached the stage where 
they could agree not so much on the optimal level of pollution 
reduction but on the need to shift at least part of that cost to other, 
less developed states. 
A. The Clean Water Act: Succeeding Through Subsidies  
If, as argued above, both industry and local citizens in heavily 
industrialized localities with water pollution problems wanted water 
pollution reduced, then simple public choice economics suggests that 
there should have been no barrier to the passage of locally efficient 
pollution control measures. That is, with both the benefits and costs 
of pollution control being internalized to a particular locality, that 
locality would have the proper incentive to reduce pollution. However, 
concerns of loss of industry were real, and cost is cost. Where there is 
a way for industrialized localities to receive the benefits of cleaner 
waterways but shift at least part of the cost elsewhere, then such a 
move would have made such localities better off relative to a world in 
which they bore the entire cost. The best solution for such 
industrialized communities would be to have other less polluted and 
less developed localities help pay for water pollution reduction.  
1. Water Pollution Control Federalization 
The stage for comprehensive federal water pollution regulation 
was set during the 1960s. It was during this period that the causes 
and costs of rectifying the water pollution problem afflicting 
industrialized areas was clearly identified. Federal-state conferences 
held under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1961 pointed 
to both industry and municipal sewage treatment (or the lack thereof) 
as the prime culprits in the water pollution problems facing 
Cleveland, Detroit, and other Great Lakes metropolitan centers.153 Yet 
these conferences repeatedly foundered on the issue of the degree of 
sewage treatment needed from municipalities. The head of Detroit’s 
water and sewer system was concerned that the cost entailed by 
higher treatment standards would deter suburban communities from 
hooking up to Detroit’s system; the massive cost of digging up 
Cleveland’s antiquated combined sewer system (in which street runoff 
and sanitary sewage were combined, overloading treatment facilities 
during intense rain events) led to continuing local political 
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opposition.154 Cities such as Detroit and Cleveland were clear that 
their willingness to upgrade wastewater treatment facilities was 
contingent upon the federal government coming through with the 
promised subsidies.155 The stalemate was broken only when Great 
Lakes governors succeeded in lobbying for a much larger federal 
construction grant program to finance the construction and upgrading 
of municipal sewage treatment facilities.156 
These lobbying efforts succeeded in the Clean Water Restoration 
Act of 1966.157 In passing that law, Congress ignored the Johnson 
Administration’s river basin approach to pollution abatement—an 
approach that would have tended to reduce state-level authority—and 
instead vastly increased federal funding for municipal waste treatment 
plants from $150 million to $450 million for fiscal year 1968, rising 
steadily to $1.25 billion in fiscal year 1971.158 The Act removed the 
ceilings on the federal share of individual projects and set a fifty-
percent federal share for projects in states that paid twenty-five 
percent and established enforceable water quality standards.159 
The Vietnam War intervened, however, and federal contributions 
throughout the 1960s fell short of the promised amounts, with only 
$214 million of the $700 million authorized for 1969 actually 
appropriated.160 By 1972, the federal government had contributed only 
seven percent of New York’s Pure Waters construction program.161 At 
the same time, upgrading municipal treatment facilities became 
increasingly important because a larger and larger share of industrial 
wastes were being discharged into municipal treatment systems. In 
Milwaukee, for instance, the biological oxygen demand of the 
industrial effluent sent to the city system was equal to that from a 
 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 86. 
156. Id. at 64. The boldest such “lobbying” effort was Nelson Rockefeller’s 
1964 Pure Waters Program for New York state. Rockefeller proposed a 
$1.7 billion sewage treatment facility construction program, which 
assumed a thirty percent contribution from the federal government, a 
contribution far greater than current federal law allowed. Convinced 
that the problem in large urban states like New York was so severe that 
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“prefinanced” the federal government’s share of projects—he used the 
proceeds of state bond sales to pay for total project construction costs in 
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city of approximately 1.6 million. Since the Milwaukee system served 
a population of approximately one million, the industrial load made 
up well more than half of the (BOD measured) total load sent to that 
city’s system.162 The vastly increased industrial load on municipal 
wastewater treatment systems gave municipalities an additional 
argument in seeking increased federal funding in the 1972 Clean 
Water Act. 
The stated goals of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972163 (FWPCA) are to obtain zero discharge of 
pollutants into the nation’s waters by 1985, and as an interim goal, to 
get all waters to the fishable and swimmable state by 1983.164 Like the 
CAA, the FWPCA represents a stab at cooperative federalism, under 
which the federal government has both standard-setting and 
enforcement authority but States retain the primary role in reducing 
water pollution. In the water quality area, cooperative federalism 
means that each State is responsible for categorizing bodies of water 
within the state. While the FWPCA itself directly authorizes pressure 
from the federal EPA on States to eliminate water quality use 
categories below fishable-swimmable (i.e., industrial use, or low water 
quality), there are over one hundred different categories used by 
States across the country. Moreover, aside from high quality 
watersheds (for which there are uniform anti-degradation criteria) 
there are no uniform standards for what counts as fishable-swimmable 
or any other use designation.165 
2. Cooperative Federalism Under the Clean Water Act: 
Federal Subsidies, Local Standards 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Clean Water Act’s 
“cooperative federalism” approach was the requirement (added by the 
1977 Amendments) that the EPA set separate “pretreatment” 
standards for industrial discharges into publicly owned treatment 
works (POTW’s).166 Although the federal law clearly requires the 
 
162. Id. at 86. 
163. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). 
164. Id. § 101(a)(1)–(2), 86 Stat. 816.  
165. Evan J. Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State 
Level: Politics and Progress in Controlling Pollution 54 
(1993).  
166. “Pretreatment” refers to the treatment of a pollutant by an industrial 
facility prior to putting its wastewater into a public sewer system. See 
40 C.F.R. § 403.3(s) (2012). The pretreatment requirements are set out 
in the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–217, § 54(a), 91 Stat. 
1566, 1591 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (2006)), and 40 C.F.R. § 
403.3(s) (2012)).  
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EPA to require industrial facilities that discharge into POTW’s to 
meet a nationally uniform “best available technology” based cleanup 
standard,167 the EPA took over almost ten years to promulgate its 
first set of categorical pretreatment standards (industry-wide 
standards for particular specified toxic pollutants).168 Moreover, the 
standards are actually implemented and enforced at the local level. It 
is the POTW’s themselves who have the job of permitting industries 
that are discharging into their systems and monitoring permit 
compliance.169 The only federal requirement for industries that 
discharge into POTW’s is a semi-annual discharge report and 
notification of additional loads that would interfere with the operation 
of the POTW.170 Over ten years after the pretreatment program was 
written into the Clean Water Act, local implementation was, 
according to one prominent commentator, “in a state of chaos.”171 
Most pertinently, he observed that “if the purpose of a national 
discharge program were to offset the political pressures on states to 
relax their programs, the pressures are even more formidable at the 
local level, producing a wide variety of standards and levels of 
compliance among the local municipal systems.”172 On a state 
regulatory failure theory of federal environmental controls, the way 
that the Clean Water Act regulates discharges into POTW’s is  
indeed pathological. 
To understand the delegation to localities of the implementation 
of pretreatment standards, one must understand also that the main 
impact of the FWPCA has not been through uniform national water 
quality standards, but rather through the Municipal Wastewater 
Treatment grant program. As explained above, the water pollution 
problem was stalemated at the state level largely because of the 
longstanding municipal practice of dumping untreated (or barely 
treated, e.g. by passage through settling ponds) sewage directly into 
lakes, rivers, and oceans.173 The municipal wastewater grant program 
in the 1972 FWPCA broke the stalemate by providing federal funding 
for seventy-five percent of the cost of constructing municipal 
 
167. See Clean Water Act of 1977 § 53(a), 91 Stat. 1589–90 (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)); 40 C.F.R. § 401.12 (2012). 
168. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA/625/10·86/005, Environ-
mental Regulations and Technology: The National Pretreat-
ment Program (1986).  
169. Id. at 10–11. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(f) (2012). 
170. 40 C.F.R. § 403.12(e) (2012). 
171. Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America’s 
Coastal Zone, 47 Md. L. Rev. 358, 384 (1988). 
172. Id. at 385–86 (footnotes omitted). 
173. Ringquist, supra note 165, at 54. 
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wastewater treatment plants meeting the FWPCA requirement of 
secondary treatment (removal of eighty-five of most pollutants and 
nutrients).174 Even after Amendments to Clean Water Act in 1981 
reduced the federal government’s share of the cost of new wastewater 
treatment works to fifty-five percent, by 1988 the federal government 
had spent somewhere between forty-five billion dollars and sixty-nine 
billion dollars (between roughly $90 and $138 billion in 2014 dollars) 
paying for new municipal wastewater treatment facilities.175 This 
expenditure is a substantial fraction of the estimated total of $300 
billion spent on water pollution control during this period.176  
As a leading student of state environmental programs has  
pointed out:  
The municipal wastewater treatment grant program was 
probably equal parts environmental policy and development 
policy. Serious water quality problems were limiting the 
potential growth in some municipalities, and wastewater 
treatment plants removed this obstacle to growth. In addition, 
every state was entitled to at least one-half of 1 percent of the 
total wastewater treatment grant budget, regardless of need, 
which reinforced the redistributive (some would say pork barrel) 
character of the program.177  
Pork barrel or not, the grant program succeeded in doubling the 
number of municipal wastewater treatment plants providing 
secondary treatment or better between 1977 and 1983,178 and in 
decreasing the amount of wastes (measured by biological oxygen 
demand) leaving such facilities by forty-six percent between 1972 and 
1982.179 Between 1970 and 1985, the fraction of the U.S. population 
served by wastewater treatment increased from forty-two percent to 
seventy-four percent.180  
Despite the centrality of the grant program to realized reductions 
in point source pollution under the FWPCA, the program merits little 
attention in environmental law casebooks. These texts focus instead 
on the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
 
174. Id. at 54. The federal subsidies are authorized by the Clean Water Act 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–217, §§ 9–54(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1568–1591 
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1299 (2006)).  
175. See Ringquist, supra note 165, at 55, 172. 
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under which industrial and municipal facilities that discharge 
pollutants into navigable waters must meet technology-based effluent 
standards that are uniform within a particular industry. While it is 
true that industrial facilities have significantly reduced their effluent 
discharge since the passage of the FWPCA, much of this 
improvement has come about because industrial polluters no longer 
directly discharge pollutants into waterways. Instead, since the mid-
1970s roughly half of all industrial polluters have discharged their 
wastes into municipal wastewater treatment systems.181 Indeed, by 
1990, only twenty-seven percent of industrial oxygen-demanding 
wastes and thirty-nine percent of industrial suspended solids were 
discharged directly into waterways.182 Thus, well over half of the 
seventy-one percent decrease in industrial waste discharge loads that 
occurred between 1974 and 1981183 was due simply to the diversion of 
industrial wastes into municipal wastewater systems for treatment  
by POTW’s. 
On my theory, the FWPCA was a way for heavily industrialized 
and polluted localities to reduce water pollution while shifting part of 
the cost to taxpayers in less polluted places. This redistributive theory 
explains these two key features of the FWPCA: the delegation of the 
implementation of POTW pretreatment standards to the POTW’s 
themselves, and the massive federal grants to improve such POTW’s. 
Because the water pollution problem was local, and because that 
problem was dealt with primarily by converting direct dischargers 
into indirect dischargers to local POTW’s, it is hardly surprising that 
local POTW’s set the standards that local polluters are required to 
meet. Improvements in local water quality came about primarily from 
the federal POTW grant program. That program was not intended to 
force local municipalities to do anything. It represented instead an 
overt and massive transfer of federal funds to industry and local 
governments in old industrialized localities and the promise of future 
funds for newer industrializing localities. It enabled older, developed 
regions to cleanup local environments that had been despoiled by 
decades of relatively uncontrolled growth. In newer regions that were 
just entering their growth phases, it provided a significant subsidy for 
what would otherwise be locally funded, and locally beneficial, public 
infrastructure.  
A large number of localities could expect to benefit from increased 
federal POTW subsidies—indeed, only a locality that was neither 
industrialized nor expected to attract new industries in the future 
would have seen a net cost from the subsidies. The federal water  
181. Ringquist, supra note 165, at 174. 
182. Id. 
183. Richard A. Smith, Richard B. Alexander & M. Gordon Wolman, Water-
Quality Trends in the Nation’s Rivers, 235 Sci. 1607, 1609 (1987). 
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pollution control laws—both the 1972 Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act and the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 (which, 
recall, removed the dollar ceilings on individual projects)—were thus a 
form of legislative universalism: political pork benefiting virtually all 
members of Congress.184 Voting on these two pieces of legislation 
strikingly confirms this universalism. The 1966 Clean Water 
Restoration Act was approved by a 312 to 0 vote in the House and by 
90 to 0 in the Senate.185 The FWPCA of 1972 was approved 86 to 0 in 
the Senate186 and by a vote of 380 to 14 in the House.187  
Finally, on my theory, one ought not to be surprised by the fact 
that the total amount of pollutants entering the nation’s waters from 
sewage treatment plants did not decline despite massive federal 
subsidies to upgrade and build new treatment works.188 The federal 
program was intended to subsidize continued economic growth, and 
the continued increases in municipal wastes that such growth entails.  
B. The Clean Air Act: Federal Minimum Standards as Regional 
Protectionism and Local Counter-Majoritarianism 
The belief that the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970 resulted from 
the States’ complete inability or unwillingness to promulgate air 
quality standards is today so widespread as to make citation 
superfluous.189 It is in fact true that although the federal Air Quality 
Act of 1967 authorized States to establish air quality standards, by 
1970, no State had completed the standard-setting task.190 But it is a 
huge and empirically unwarranted leap to infer a race-to-the-bottom 
among the states from this administrative failure. Unwarranted first 
because as already discussed, as of 1970, most states did have a 
generalized air pollution problem. Up until the 1960s, by far the most 
widespread and salient air pollution problem in America was smoke 
from the burning of coal, and this problem had always been dealt 
with by local rather than state government. Cities and counties had 
demonstrated, moreover, tremendous success in dealing with the 
 
184. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization 
of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as 
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185. Kehoe, supra note 138, at 85. 
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1984, at 31. 
189. See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, Blue Skies, Green Politics: The 
Clean Air Act of 1990 and Its Implementation 98 (2d ed. 1995).  
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smoke problem. Unwarranted finally because as a matter of political 
economy, the federal Clean Air Act became viable simply because 
local air pollution from automobiles had become a problem in a 
sufficient amount of urban areas to make the problem “national” in 
scope. Even more significantly, the federal Clean Air Act was 
implemented only when it was amended in 1977 to include a 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration requirement that reduced the 
comparative advantage of less-developed, less-polluted states in 
competing for new industrial plants.  
After briefly overviewing the 1970 Clean Air Act, this Part 
explains the simple but powerful economics driving the passage of the 
kind of federal minimum standards that are at the heart of the Clean 
Air Act. I then detail the story of the passage of the key minimum 
standard in the Clean Air Act, the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) Standard. 
1. The 1970 Clean Air Act 
As the federal courts never tire of repeating, the original, 1970 
version of the Clean Air Act set out a two-stage process for federal air 
pollution regulation. At the first stage, the federal EPA is required by 
Section 109 to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for six 
commonly found air pollutants. These criteria pollutants are 
particulate matter, ground-level ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur 
oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead. There are two types of air quality 
standards. Under Section 109(b)(1), the EPA is instructed to set 
primary air quality standards at levels “requisite to protect the public 
health” with an “adequate margin of safety.”191 Under Section 
109(b)(2), the EPA is also tasked with the job of setting secondary air 
quality standards at a level that “is requisite to protect the public 
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with 
the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.” Secondary 
standards must be at least as stringent as the primary standards. 
Importantly, both primary and secondary NAAQs are nationally 
uniform minimum ambient air quality standards.  
Importantly, when Congress passed the CAA in 1970, it 
understood air pollution as a “localized phenomenon that is best 
handled as a state program with minimum federal involvement.”192 
Unsurprisingly given this understanding, under the Clean Air Act’s 
original structure, Congress delegated to the States the job of figuring 
out how to reduce pollution from existing sources. States are required 
to develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure that the 
 
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7 
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nationally uniform NAAQs are met in each air quality region within 
the state.193 Regions generally cut across a number of counties, and 
are supposed to correspond to airsheds (e.g., Metropolitan Los 
Angeles, or the San Francisco Bay Area). State discretion in crafting 
SIPs was limited by Congress; Section 110(a)(2) sets out a long list of 
requirements that SIPs must contain,194 and Section 110(a)(3) requires 
each state to get federal EPA approval for its SIP.195  
With respect to new stationary sources of air pollution, the 1970 
Clean Air Act exhibited much less trust in state regulatory authority. 
The CAA instructed the federal EPA to set standards for new or 
modified sources of air pollution within source categories (e.g., 
commercial-industrial steam generating units of a certain minimum 
generating capacity).196 The new source performance standards 
(NSPS) are to be based on the “best system of emission reduction 
which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and 
any non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated.”197 Thus with respect to new sources, the CAA 
required national source-specific emission standards that were uniform 
across sources in particular categories.  
The other core feature of the original CAA was its regulation of 
mobile sources of air pollution—primarily automobiles. Here, the basic 
structure adopted by the CAA was drawn directly from the earlier 
federal Air Pollution Control Act of 1967; the federal EPA sets 
technology-based auto exhaust emission standards, requiring a mix of 
combustion and post-combustion controls that reduce emissions of 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds and 
other unburned hydrocarbons and (from diesel engines) particulate 
matter.198 Under the CAA, only California was allowed to set tougher 
auto emission standards than those set by the federal EPA.199 Thus, 
aside from potentially even tougher standards in California, the   
193. § 1857c-2(a) (1970) (current version at § 7407(a) (2006)); 40 C.F.R. § 81 
(2012) (listing air quality control regions in Appendix A). 
194. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2006) (Every SIP must include “enforceable 
emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques 
. . . as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable [CAA] 
requirements.”). 
195. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970) (current version at § 7410(a)(3)(B) (2006)). 
196. § 1857c-6(a)(1) (1970) (current version at § 7411(a)(1) (2006)).  
197. Id. 
198. See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 
6 Envtl. Law. 309, 321–25, 338–43 (2000). 
199. See Bailey, supra note 101, at 134–35; Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95–95, § 177, 91 Stat. 680, 750 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2006)).  
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CAA set nationally uniform, technology-based standards for auto  
exhaust emissions. 
2. Explaining the Clean Air Act: The Simple Economics of (Locally) 
Counter-Majoritarian Federal Minimum Environmental Standards 
The key to demonstrating how federal environmental laws were 
passed by a majority in the U.S. Congress is in recognizing that for 
the most part, those laws imposed nationally uniform minimum 
environmental standards. Whenever such minimum federal standards 
bind, they force relatively undeveloped jurisdictions to require more 
stringent environmental controls than their residents would choose 
under decentralized decision-making. Inasmuch as higher levels of 
environmental cleanup and control are increasingly costly on the 
margin, such federal minima increase the cost to businesses of locating 
in or relocating to undeveloped jurisdictions relative to what the costs 
would be under decentralized regulation. On the margin, federal 
minima discourage businesses from relocating to take advantage of the 
cheaper labor and raw materials found in the undeveloped 
jurisdiction.200 They thereby cut the economic cost of pollution 
reduction—in terms of lost industries, jobs and taxes—to developed 
jurisdictions. Federal minima are a form of economic protectionism, 
protecting developed jurisdictions from competition by lesser-
developed jurisdictions for mobile capital. 
One can show that regardless of whether there is any actual 
“federal” problem—such as spillovers across jurisdictions—the 
existence of a federal legislature itself is enough to ensure majority 
support for federal minimum standards. More precisely, federal 
minimum standards will almost always get majoritarian support in a 
federal legislature.201 Figure 1 shows why this is so. The figure depicts 
the frequency distribution of voter preferences for pollution reduction 
 
200. Pashigian, supra note 27, at 558 (“If the rents of remaining factors 
specific to a location declined when factors moved as a consequence of 
the cost of complying with more stringent local regulations, the owners 
of the location specific factors would support federal policies that 
reduced mobility. . . . By raising the cost of mobility, any improvement 
in local air quality could be achieved but with a smaller reduction in the 
rents of factors specific to the locality.”). While recognizing the 
importance of the anticompetitive motive in PSD policy, Pashigian 
failed to see that it explains many other instances of federal 
environmental regulation as well. 
201. See Jacques Crémer & Thomas R. Palfrey, Federal Mandates by 
Popular Demand, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 905, 912 (2000) [hereinafter 
Crémer & Palfrey, Popular Demand] (showing that the federal standard 
would equal the average standard throughout the districts); Jacques 
Crémer & Thomas R. Palfrey, Federal Mandates with Local Agenda 
Setters, 7 Rev. Econ. Design 279 (2002) (developing a model that 
investigates how local voters respond to federal mandates).  
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in a simple three-jurisdiction world. Each voter has what are known 
as Euclidean preferences, meaning that the voter’s utility from the 
actual public policy outcome declines linearly with the outcome’s 
distance from the voter’s ideal point. As can be seen from the Figure, 
the jurisdictions can be ranked in terms of the preferences for 
pollution reduction of the median voter in each: high, moderate, and 
low. The respective median points—eh , em , and el—are the pollution 
control standards under decentralization, that is, the standards that 
would get majority voter support were a referendum held in  
each jurisdiction.202 
 
Figure 1: Majoritarian Choice of a Federal Minimum Standard 
 
Now consider a federal referendum in which voters choose a 
minimum pollution control standard for all three jurisdictions. The 
federal minimum chosen in such a referendum would be em. This can 
be understood by looking at each jurisdiction. The federal minimum 
does not prevent the high demand jurisdiction from going ahead and 
setting local mandates that are much higher, and so voters there are 
relatively indifferent to the level of the federal minimum standard.  
202. The median voter theorem—that majoritarian elections produce the 
median voter’s preferred outcome—is truly a theorem, in that there are 
a number of assumptions regarding both voter preferences and the 
electoral process that must be true for the result to obtain. It does hold 
in the simplified world considered by Crémer and Palfrey. See generally 
Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky, Democracy & Decision: 
The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference 76–81 (1993) 
(discussing the limitations of the median voter theorem). 
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Voters in the moderate demand jurisdiction can simply vote their 
preferences, and end up with the federal minimum being set at a level 
that they would have set independently. Regardless of what voters in 
the low demand jurisdiction adopt as a voting strategy, they cannot 
prevent em from being chosen.  
Observe that this federal minimum standard binds and alters the 
regulatory outcome only in the low demand jurisdiction. Observe also, 
however, that for a minority of voters in the low demand jurisdiction, 
the federal minimum is closer to their preferred level of environmental 
cleanup than is the level el that is chosen by local residents of their 
jurisdiction (in the Figure, all voters in the low demand jurisdiction 
who prefer a level of pollution control at or above em are better off 
with the federal minimum). Hence for the minority in the generally 
low demand jurisdiction, that jurisdiction’s membership in the 
federation gives them the ability to get much tougher pollution 
control standards than they would be able to achieve under  
local control.  
This result holds even when the model is extended from standards 
chosen by popular referenda to standards chosen by legislatures.203 It 
predicts that the prime beneficiaries of the passage of federal laws 
mandating minimum federal pollution control standards for the states 
will be the strongly pro-environmental minority in states that would 
otherwise not regulate so stringently. For this reason, it may be called 
the “counter-majoritarian” motive for federal mandates. It is not the 
developed jurisdiction majority who benefit from counter-majoritarian 
federal mandates, but rather the strongly pro-environmental minority 
in undeveloped jurisdictions. Because the local environment in 
undeveloped jurisdictions is relatively undisturbed but wealth and 
income are relatively low, it is plausible that the median voter in such 
a jurisdiction does not prefer such strong pollution control and is 
willing to tolerate relatively high levels of pollution in exchange for 
development. In such jurisdictions, stringent environmental controls 
are desired by a local minority who wish to preserve a pristine albeit 
relatively poor local environment.  
The anticompetitive and counter-majoritarian motives for federal 
environmental cleanup mandates are complementary. What drives the 
anticompetitive motive is the concern of the developed community 
majority that they will lose jobs and income if they mandate locally 
desired but costly pollution reduction. Costly federal pollution control 
mandates prevent lesser-developed jurisdictions from benefiting from 
the natural competitive advantage provided by cheap land, labor and 
raw materials. What drives the counter-majoritarian motive is the 
concern of a strongly pro-environmental minority in undeveloped 
 
203. See Crémer & Palfrey, Popular Demand, supra note 201, at 908–12. 
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jurisdictions that local residents prefer economic growth and 
development at the expense of some environmental degradation.  
As a matter of positive prediction, the anticompetitive and 
counter-majoritarian models identify two groups of voters who should 
support federal minimum environmental standards: the majority of 
developed jurisdiction voters, and a limited but potentially intense 
minority in undeveloped jurisdictions. What drives federal minima are 
differing preferences for environmental cleanup. Inasmuch as they are 
anticompetitive, such federal minima reflect different preferences 
across jurisdictions—they enable developed jurisdiction voters to force 
lesser-developed jurisdictions to adopt tougher standards than their 
residents prefer. Inasmuch as they are counter-majoritarian, federal 
minima reflect preference differences both across jurisdictions and 
within jurisdictions. They force a higher level of environmental 
cleanup than the median voter in the lesser-developed jurisdiction 
wants, thereby giving residents of that jurisdiction who have a high 
demand for environmental amenities something that they could not 
get through the local, decentralized political process.  
3. From PSD to the Rise of Technology-Based Standards 
Under the Clean Air Act 
The positive theory of protectionist and counter-majoritarian 
federal environmental standards can be applied to explain both the 
centrality of the PSD program to the passage of the CAA, and the 
subsequent evolution of federal minimum standards under the CAA. 
a. The PSD Standards and the Passage of the CAA 
In its original, skeletal form, the Clean Air Act could well have 
been understood as based on a cooperative federalism model, which 
preserved an important role for the states and allowed at least some 
flexibility to the states to weigh the localized costs and benefits of 
pollution reduction. As the Court said in one of its first opportunities 
to interpret the CAA, “so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s 
choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national 
standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever 
mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular 
situation.”204 And, in reiterating many years later that the federal 
EPA may not consider the compliance cost of alternative standards in 
setting NAAQs, the Court stressed it would be “impossible” for states 
to design SIPs “without considering which abatement technologies are 
most efficient, and most economically feasible—which is why we have 
said that ‘the most important forum for consideration of claims of 
 
204. Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). 
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economic and technological infeasibility is before the state agency 
formulating the implementation plan.’”205  
As recounted earlier, however, when the Federal Clean Air Act 
was passed in 1970, it was against a background of rapidly escalating 
state and local air pollution regulation. Indeed, when the federal EPA 
issued the first draft NAAQs in January 1971, environmentalists in 
California, Massachusetts, and Colorado argued that the proposed 
federal standards were weaker than the standards that their own 
states had already adopted.206 In other states, a vocal minority 
protested that the new federal air standards were not tough enough. 
The complaints came from citizen and environmental groups located 
in two regions in particular: the Southwestern states, where residents 
were concerned about the effects on tourist demand for pristine air 
from emissions at massive new proposed coal-fired power plants 
located in the Four Corners region; and the heavily industrial Rust 
Belt area, where the local effects of pollution from the burning of coal 
were most pronounced.207 Such complaints were to be expected. From 
the early 1960s, two national interest groups strongly supported the 
movement for federal air pollution control.208 One group, spearheaded 
by the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, emphasized the 
harm to local public health caused by air pollution in highly 
developed, urban areas.209 Another group, led by the Sierra Club and 
the National Wildlife Federation, was interested primarily in 
protecting undeveloped natural resources from commercial 
development.210 These groups were concerned not with dirty air, but 
with clean air; not with cleaning up fouled airsheds in heavily 
developed parts of the country, but in preventing the pollution of 
clean airsheds in undeveloped parts of the country.  
This preservationist goal was at the heart of evolving federal air 
pollution policy from the very beginning. The Preamble to the 1967 
federal Air Quality Act stated that the purpose of federal air pollution 
legislation was “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 
productive capacity of its population.”211 The very first administrative 
interpretations of the 1967 Act understood federal law as requiring 
 
205. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470 (2001) (quoting 
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976)). 
206. Vietor, supra note 100, at 163. 
207. Id. at 161–63. 
208. Id. at 135–37, 197–98. 
209. Id. at 135, 147.  
210. Id. at 197–98. 
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) 
(2006)) (emphasis added). 
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the prevention of “significant deterioration” (“PSD”) of air quality in 
relatively pristine areas of the country.212 In public hearings across the 
country, the new federal air regulators made quite clear their 
interpretation that under the 1967 law, “standard setting activity by 
the State is called for even if the level of air quality in the region is 
better than that which the criteria would require.”213  
The retention of the “protect and enhance” language in the 1970 
Clean Air Act was the product of intense lobbying by national 
conservation groups such as the Sierra Club, and such groups 
continued to lobby the EPA to include PSD requirements in initial 
proposed guidelines for the state implementation plans required by 
the Act.214 Led by a coalition of coal producers and users, industry 
succeeded in exerting sufficient pressure in regulatory lobbying to 
prevent the inclusion of a PSD requirement in the EPA’s 1971 
implementation guidelines.215  
Without such a requirement, the only constraint on the ability of 
relatively undeveloped Western and Southern states to compete away 
industry from the Northeast and Rust Belt regions would have been 
the new source review technology-based pollution standards imposed 
on new sources of pollution. A SIP written by a State already in 
attainment with the NAAQs could have allowed as many new sources 
of pollution as it wished, provided that the NAAQs were not 
exceeded. For this reason, the environmental groups filed suit soon 
after the passage of the CAA, arguing in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus216 
that the PSD requirements found in the 1967 federal clean air law 
should also be read into the 1970 Act. 
Their argument hinged entirely upon general language in Section 
110(b) of the CAA (the statutory purpose section), stating a 
Congressional purpose “to protect and enhance the quality of the 
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare.”217 There was no provision in the 1970 Clean Air Act saying 
anything specifically about a non-deterioration policy. On a basic 
principle of statutory interpretation, standing alone, a provision 
setting out a general purpose of a statute mandates nothing. However, 
 
212. See Vietor, supra note 100, at 199 (discussing National Air Pollution 
Control Administration interpretation in early 1968). 
213. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
214. Id. at 202–03. 
215. Veitor, supra note 100, at 203. 
216. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 
20,656 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. 
Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).  
217. Id. at 255 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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relying on a statement in the Senate Report (and, even worse, 
testimony by HEW administrators) that SIPs must provide for non-
degradation of air quality in areas already in attainment with national 
air quality standards, the district court ruled that SIPs must provide 
for PSD.218  
The EPA immediately initiated rulemaking in 1973 to incorporate 
PSD requirements into SIPs.219 This 1973 decision triggered what one 
historian has called a “storm of protest from the industrial 
community.”220 The coal industry in particular was outraged. 
Throughout the postwar era, the coal industry had been steadily and 
swiftly losing ground to oil, natural gas and nuclear energy sources 
that had all enjoyed massive federal subsidies as coal languished. Just 
when the energy crisis of the early 1970s had promised to finally 
reverse the coal industry’s fortunes, the PSD program came along.221 
Industry leaders recognized that the PSD program was not about 
public health but about growth control.222 A Shell Oil vice president 
commented that “I am not at all sure, . . . of some of the proponents 
[of PSD]—in fact, it appears that genuine concern for our 
environment is being used by others to achieve quite different 
objectives.”223 A U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative forecast 
that PSD would “mandate undeveloped areas [of the United States] 
into eternal poverty.”224 As of the mid-1970s, if economic development 
was to proceed in relatively undeveloped parts of the United States, it 
would be powered by coal. And if PSD was required, economic 
development in such areas would be slowed, perhaps significantly. 
By 1975, the PSD issue was the central problem confronting 
Congress in considering how to amend the Clean Air Act. It was of 
course not the only issue. In the midst of the energy crisis and 
prolonged economic recession of the 1970s, neither the automobile 
manufacturers nor polluted urban areas had made any progress at all 
toward achieving the emissions reductions and ambient air quality 
levels required by the 1970 Clean Air Act. Still, from the point of  
218. The District Court decision in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus would almost 
surely have been overturned by a majority of the Supreme Court, had 
the full Court actually sat on the case. However, as his old law firm had 
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of industry, Justice Lewis Powell 
recused himself from the case, leading to an affirmation of the lower 
court by virtue of a 4–4 tie. Richard Lazarus, A Tall Tale That Happens 
to Be True, Envtl. F. July–Aug. 2012, at 12, 12. 
219. Fri, 412 U.S. at 541; Vietor, supra note 100, at 203–04. 
220. Vietor, supra note 100, at 203. 
221. Id. at 205–07.  
222. Id. at 208.  
223. Id. at 206–07 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
224. Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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view of many actors, the PSD requirement was the primary focus. 
Ford Administration Interior Secretary Morton told Senator Muskie’s 
oversight committee that “since coal conversion is the keystone of an 
effective energy program . . . we have problems resulting from court 
decisions with respect to significant air quality deterioration.”225 The 
Sierra Club’s congressional testimony spoke only about the weakness 
of the EPA’s proposed PSD program and the need for far tougher 
standards. Perhaps most importantly, through the National League of 
Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, urban mayors and Eastern 
industrial states strongly supported a strong PSD program.226 Indeed, 
their brief to the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus had 
clearly and succinctly summarized the protectionist rationale 
underlying the PSD program: 
The health of the economies of the urban-industrial regions is 
dependent upon industrial continuation and growth. It is in the 
best economic interest of these regions that sources [of air 
pollution] remain in them and utilize the emission controls 
necessary. . . . The requirement of no-significant deterioration 
prevents rural regions from allowing lenient emission controls 
that are so much less expensive that an industry will have a 
financial incentive to relocate . . . [N]o significant deterioration 
removes the possibility of economic coercion between competing 
regions.227 
Congressional representatives from older, more heavily developed 
jurisdictions were more than responsive to this argument. For 
instance, in defending uniform national new source performance 
standards and the mandatory PSD programs under the Clean Air 
Act, Senator Cooper stated that such national standards would 
“eliminate a large element of ‘forum shopping’ that is possible if new 
facilities are not required to meet the level of pollution control,”228 
Representative Prior said, “if we do not have national standards, we 
find what has happened is that States begin to bid against each other 
 
225. Id. at 210 (quoting Implementation of the Clean Air Act—1975: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on 
Pub. Works, 94th Cong., 280 (1975) [hereinafter Implementation of the 
Clean Air Act] (statement of Hon. Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of 
the Interior)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
226. Id. at 212. 
227. Id. at 212 (quoting Implementation of the Clean Air Act, supra note 
225, at 852 (statement of Richard M. Lahn, Washington Rep. of the 
Sierra Club, Accompanied by Bruce Terris)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
228. 116 Cong. Rec. 33116 (1970). 
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to attract polluting industries.”229 Such statements say nothing 
explicit about a regulatory race-to-the-bottom. What they do clearly 
show is that Congress was well aware that federal legislation can 
prevent interstate competition for economic development 
opportunities. 
Facing such a diverse but united constituency in favor of the PSD 
requirement, industry united in proposing the polar opposite: the 
complete elimination of the PSD concept from federal air pollution 
law.230 In 1975, eight of the largest oil companies in the world sued to 
enjoin the EPA from implementing its recently written PSD 
requirements. The plaintiff corporations—all involved in mining or 
developing coal and all holding vast coal reserves—presented studies 
showing that PSD regulations would destroy as much as eighty-six 
percent of the market for West Virginia coal,231 while “[i]n the West, 
with its extensive deposits of oil shale and uranium in addition to 
coal, the inhibitive effects of the regulations would be even more 
severe[,] . . . rais[ing] serious concern[s] for the economic survival of 
the rural areas of the Nation.”232 As Congress appeared headed toward 
retaining the PSD requirement, industrial emphasis on the growth-
retarding consequences of PSD grew even stronger. The head of the 
National Coal Association told coal operators that “no-significant 
deterioration . . . has already caused the coal and electric industries 
more harm than any other single interpretation of the Clean Air 
Act. . . . This decision can and, no doubt, will be used to halt 
development across the land.”233 By 1977, the American Mining 
Congress argued against PSD on the ground that “federal regulation 
of growth in this context should be confined to providing procedural 
guidelines that will assist the States to arrive at rational 
judgments.”234 
As environmental historian Richard Vietor has perceptively 
observed, by the time of the 1977 Amendments, the debate over PSD 
had become an explicit debate about the appropriateness of federal 
controls on economic growth and development “as if twenty years had 
brought the conflict between the energy industry and 
 
229. Id. at 19213. The argument was also made in the relevant committee 
reports. See H.R. Rep No. 96-294, at 133–35 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 
91-1146, at 3 (1970). 
230. VIETOR, supra note 100, at 213. 
231. Id. at 215.  
232. Id. at 215–16 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
233. Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
234. Id. at 223 (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Pub. 
Works, 95th Cong. 506 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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environmentalists full circle, once again arguing federal versus state 
authority, but on a different issue—that of limiting growth rather 
than of actually cleaning up the environment.”235 
Congress ultimately wrote the PSD requirement into the 1977 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Those PSD requirements are 
complex, but briefly if incompletely summarized, the PSD program 
prohibits major new sources of air pollution from being constructed in 
areas already meeting (in attainment with) NAAQs unless they (1) 
install “the best available technology” (BACT)236 to control any 
criteria pollutant emitted in potentially “significant” amounts and (2) 
also have results from approved computer air quality models showing 
that the additional pollution will not “cause or contribute” to too 
large an increase in the “baseline [ambient] concentration” of the 
pollutant in that area. 
This complexity directly reflects the intense regional contest over 
the PSD requirements that took place within the U.S. Senate. An 
amendment in the Senate that would have placed a moratorium on 
the PSD program was supported by Southern conservative 
Democrats, Western energy states with multiple national parks (and 
therefore very severe non-deterioration requirements), and 
Appalachian coal states. The amendment was opposed, successfully, 
by Eastern, Central and Pacific state senators.237 A clearer division 
between the interest of relatively undeveloped, rural states and older, 
more heavily developed and polluted states could hardly be imagined. 
This division ensured that the PSD requirement included in the 1977 
Amendments were filled with loopholes (baseline levels of ambient 
pollution, for example) that effectively allowed the construction of 
new power plants in undeveloped regions of the country.238 
 
235. Id. at 224. 
236. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006), BACT is “an emission limitation 
based on the maximum degree of [pollutant] reduction . . . which the 
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, 
determines is achievable for such facility.” Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 169(3), 91 Stat. 685, 741, 42 U.S.C. § 
7479(3) (2006). 
237. See VIETOR, supra note 100, at 218–19 (discussing the history of an 
amendment proposed by Senator Frank Moss to delay PSD for a year 
pending further study). Part of the difference across regions may reflect 
varying preferences for environmental quality, but Pashigian, supra note 
27, at 562–70, found that there was much greater regional variation in 
congressional voting on PSD policy than on auto emission policy and a 
portfolio of economic issues. Since PSD policy had much stronger 
regional redistribution effects, this finding is strong evidence that 
regional redistribution was driving the PSD vote. Id. at 569–70. 
238. VIETOR, supra note 100, at 224. 
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It is tempting to see the PSD program as something that 
Congressional representatives of older, industrial and heavily polluted 
regions got in exchange for agreeing to legislatively do something 
about their regions’ non-attainment of national air quality 
standards.239 It is true that the 1977 Amendments did establish a 
federal, technology-based standard for new sources of air pollution in 
non-attainment areas and prohibited the states from allowing such 
new source unless there were sufficient reductions in existing sources 
to “offset” the addition brought by new construction.240  
Still, relative to the situation that would have prevailed under 
decentralized, state-level regulation, the non-attainment and PSD 
programs together increased the required level of pollution control in 
less-developed states with little—if any—effect on pollution control 
requirements in more developed states. In its stationary source 
regulatory regime, therefore, the Clean Air Act significantly lowered 
the competitive cost of pollution control to older, more polluted 
industrial states and constituted a form of regulatory protectionism 
for those states. 
b. Did the PSD Standards Work? The Limitations of Existing 
Empirical Evidence  
It is not enough that a theory exists to explain the stylized facts 
of federalization. It is also important to verify that the theory is 
consistent with the available empirical evidence. Economists have 
generated a good deal of empirical evidence about things such as the 
environmental Kuznets curve. They have also spent considerable time 
and effort testing the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. The existing 
empirical work does not, however, address the predictions of the 
regulatory protectionism theory set out here.  
On that theory, States that had the worst pollution problems 
were already beginning to regulate to reduce pollution, imposing costs 
on industry that were contributing to nascent industrial flight to 
lesser developed, less polluted regions. The CAA, and in particular 
the PSD requirements, were designed to impose regulatory 
requirements on less polluted regions, requirements that were more 
stringent than the regulations that those unpolluted regions would 
have undertaken under decentralized regulation. If the PSD 
requirements worked as my account holds and actually imposed costs 
on industry that would not have been imposed without PSD 
requirements, then one would expect that after PSD requirements 
began to be imposed, holding all else equal, there was an observable 
 
239. Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, 
Science and Policy 609 (7th ed. 2013). 
240. Id. at 597.  
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slowing of industrial migration (in the sense of new plant openings) in 
relatively undeveloped, attainment areas of the United States.  
Economists have not investigated this hypothesis empirically. The 
hypothesis that they have investigated is the race-to-the-bottom (also 
called the pollution haven) hypothesis. One such body of work has 
exploited geographic variation in environmental regulatory stringency 
induced by the PSD requirement and by other changes made by the 
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. As noted above, the 1977 
Amendments required the adoption of BACT technologies in less 
polluted attainment regions. In more polluted non-attainment areas, 
the 1977 Amendments required that SIPs could allow new sources 
only if they met the “lowest achievable emission rate” (LAER), which 
is defined as the most stringent emissions limitation that is achieved 
in practice for a given source type.241 LAER requirements are 
generally more expensive, and sometimes much more expensive, than 
BACT requirements. Recent empirical work has shown that holding 
all else equal, the tougher LAER antipollution requirements imposed 
on new sources in non-attainment areas deter firms from opening new 
plants there, so that plant growth is higher in cleaner, attainment 
areas than in non-attainment areas.242 
This work confirms not only that environmental regulations do 
matter to firms in deciding where to locate their plants, but also that 
they are not the only thing that matters, that other geographic 
characteristics, such as the availability of cheap inputs to the 
production process, also impact plant location.243 Thus, this 
 
241. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172, 91 Stat. 
685, 746–747, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(2) (2006).  
242. See Randy A. Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality 
Regulations on Polluting Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379 (2000); 
Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on 
Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1175 
(2002); Matthew E. Kahn & Erin T. Mansur, Do Local Energy Prices 
and Regulation Affect the Geographic Concentration of Employment?, 
101 J. PUB. ECON. 105 (2013). More recent evidence using plant-level 
census data reveals a reason for these firm decisions about plant 
location—tougher air pollution regulations in non-attainment areas 
significantly reduce plant-level productivity. Michael Greenstone et al., 
The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of U.S. 
Manufacturing, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
18392, 2012). At the county level, however, the impact of tough 
environmental standards is likely to be less (in terms of lost plant 
openings) when the county has abundant labor (high unemployment) or 
significant industrial concentration (with attendant agglomeration 
economies). Daniel L. Millimet & John A. List, The Case of Missing 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis, 26 J. Regulatory Econ. 239, 241 (2004). 
243. Millimet, supra note 11, at 1693 (summarizing the state of this 
literature: “second generation studies—utilizing better data to identify 
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presumption of my theory seems confirmed by existing evidence. As 
discussed above (and also briefly below), states retain the authority to 
enact tougher air pollution standards than the federal minima, and 
also are responsible for permitting, monitoring and enforcing against 
particular sources of air pollution. There is evidence that some states 
have indeed regulated more stringently (in both standard-setting and 
enforcement), than is federally required.244 Even more to the point, 
there is evidence that states react strategically to the regulatory 
requirements of other states by toughening their requirements after 
adjacent states toughen their own regulations.245  
Thus while there is no study that attempts something like a 
before and after study of the PSD requirements, there is evidence that 
plant location choice is strongly influenced by environmental 
regulatory stringency, and that states are willing to impose tougher 
environmental regulatory requirements despite the potential cost in 
terms of reduced new plant openings within their borders. Both of 
these are important stylized facts in my account of American 
environmental federalization.  
c. The Continuing Rise of Technology-Based Standards in the Clean 
Air Act of 1990 
On my account, the courts and the EPA were correct—as 
Congress confirmed with the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments—to 
think that the 1970 CAA would never have been passed were it not 
understood that new sources even in attainment areas would be 
required to meet uniform technologically-based emission standards. 
The 1977 Amendments not only required major sources in attainment 
areas to install best available control technology (“BACT”)—the PSD 
program—but also required the use of LAER technologies and 
 
the causal effect of environmental policy—have consistently documented 
a meaningful effect of environmental stringency on the location of 
economic activity. That said, the findings must be interpreted  
carefully. . . . [f]or the vast majority of industries, environmental costs 
are a small fraction of overall costs and location decisions are dominated 
by other factors.” As Millimet further cautions, in econometric studies of 
the impact of environmental regulatory stringency on industrial 
location, “other important determinants of the location of economic 
activity are not held fixed such as a location’s endowment of physical 
and human capital.” 
244. See, e.g., Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to 
the Bottom?, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335 (2001) (concluding that states 
often “exceed federal EPA standards”).  
245. See Per G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Strategic Interaction and 
the Determinants of Environmental Policy Across U.S. States, 51 J. 
URBAN ECON. 101 (2002); David M. Konisky, Regulatory Competition 
and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?, 51 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 853 (2007).  
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emission offsetting for major sources in non-attainment areas. 
Inasmuch as many heavily polluted states were already about to 
require as tough or even tougher emission control standards, the CAA 
as amended in 1977—the version that actually began to be enforced—
amounted to a regime of uniform minimum standards for cleaner 
attainment areas of the country and a regime of potentially maximum 
standards for dirtier non-attainment areas.246 
This is as my theory would predict. However, after the 1977 
Amendments, the CAA was left in an internally inconsistent form. On 
the one hand, as environmental groups championed, the federal Clean 
Air Act of 1970 “marked a significant departure from prior 
approaches” by setting up NAAQs.247 And for new sources of air 
pollution, the law also required nationally uniform technology-based 
emission controls that were specific to particular industrial source 
categories (and attainment versus non-attainment regions). However, 
the CAA of 1970 also ostensibly allowed states great leeway in 
deciding how to meet the NAAQs. Under the CAA’s version of 
cooperative federalism, states were apparently to be trusted to figure 
out ways to reduce pollution from existing sources, but were not to be 
entirely trusted to set pollution control standards for new plants.  
From 1977 through 1990, States containing many of the older and 
more polluted areas of the country repeatedly missed statutory 
deadlines for meeting the NAAQs and in many areas of the country 
that had been in attainment with national standards, air quality 
actually worsened. The 1990 Amendments responded to the perceived 
problem of continuing non-attainment in two rather inconsistent 
ways. On the one hand, Congress essentially gave up on the goal of 
nationwide uniformity by creating up to six different categories of 
nonattainment areas for ozone, with different statutory compliance 
deadlines for each category.248 On the other hand, the 1990 
Amendments required for the first time that all major sources249 of air  
246. States that want to incur the costs of more stringent regulation are free 
to do so. In practice, however, once the Federal EPA has said that a 
certain ambient level of pollution is “allowing an adequate margin of 
safety, . . . requisite to protect the public health,” the case for an even 
stricter standard disappears. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-604, § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(b)(1) (2006)). 
247. Percival et al., supra note 239, at 527–28.  
248. In the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress finally gave up 
on the goal of nationwide air quality attainment, and created six 
different categories of nonattainment for ozone, three for carbon 
monoxide, and two for particulates, with compliance deadlines that vary 
by category. See 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970, 
§§ 171–78. 
249. Major sources are defined as sources that emit or have the potential to 
emit one hundred tons or more per year of any pollutant, ten tons or 
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pollution must obtain a federal operating permit.250 Under the 
Amendments, major sources were forbidden to operate without 
applying for and obtaining these federal operating permits.251 
Environmentalists reacted with outrage to the abandonment of 
nationally uniform schedules for states to come into attainment with 
the NAAQs, viewing this as a political concession that was completely 
inconsistent with the principles underlying the Clean Air Act.252 But 
as the statutory structure of the CAA itself clearly shows, that law 
was never intended by Congress to make any part of the federal 
government a credible enforcer of state efforts to meet the NAAQs. 
The Clean Air Act says that the federal EPA must impose one of two 
sanctions on any State that has failed to submit an adequate SIP: 
either the loss of federal highway funds, or the imposition of tougher 
standards for new polluting industries.253 However, at the same time, 
Congress specified that EPA cannot take away highway funding in 
“attainment” airsheds, and that even within dirtier, “nonattainment” 
areas, federal highway funds remain available for projects that 
“resolve a demonstrated safety problem and likely will result in 
significant reduction in, or avoidance of, accidents.”254 Even after 
Congress gave them more time in the 1990 Amendments, very few 
States in fact met the November 1994 deadline for submitting revised 
SIP’s for serious, severe or extreme ozone non-attainment areas,255 and 
 
more per year of any hazardous air pollutant (“HAP”) or twenty-five 
tons or more per year of any combination of HAPs. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j). 
250. Id. § 7661. 
251. Id. § 7661a(a). 
252. See Action Needed to Force States to Comply with Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Groups Say, 25 Envtl. Rep. 1373, 1373 (1994) 
(discussing criticism of efforts to regulate air quality).  
253. I use “adequacy” as a summary for the various findings that have to be 
made by EPA under Sections 179(a)(1)–(4) of the Act before a 
“deficiency” in an SIP is declared. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a)(1)–(4). The 
State then has eighteen months to correct the problem with its plan. If 
it fails to do so, Sections 179(b)(1)–(2) 42 U.S.C. Sections 7509(b)(1)–
(2) then require EPA to assess sanctions. The “tougher standards” I 
refer to are an increase in the offset requirement for new stationary 
sources within non-attainment areas, which means that new sources of 
air pollution cannot be built unless they somehow obtain a 2/1 
reduction in the total area emissions of a specified pollutant. Within two 
years of finding that a State has failed to submit an adequate SIP, 
Section 110(c)(1) of the CAA requires EPA to prepare a federal 
implementation plan for the State.  
254. Clean Air Act § 179(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A). See Virginia 
v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding constitutionality of 
sanctioning scheme under Tenth Amendment). 
255. Action Needed to Force States to Comply, supra note 252.  
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yet the EPA failed to levy sanctions against any State. Indeed, in the 
forty-plus year history of the Clean Air Act, the EPA has never 
sanctioned a State by freezing its federal highway funding in non-
attainment areas.256  
On my theory, the failure of any state to ever be federally 
sanctioned for failing to attain the NAAQs is hardly surprising. If the 
purpose of federalization is to lessen the competitive advantage of 
less-developed, less-polluted regions, then it can hardly be the older, 
more polluted regions—the primary beneficiaries of federalization—
who actually face serious penalties for failing to drastically reduce 
pollution by slowing development and imposing costly, industry-
unfriendly emission reduction requirements. An extension of deadlines 
and (de facto) relaxation of pollution reduction requirements for older, 
heavily polluted regions is exactly what on my theory one  
would predict.  
The Title V major source-permitting program created by the 1990 
Amendments is on my theory also precisely what one would predict. 
Such federal permits have turned out to provide an important 
(though by no means exclusive) avenue by which the federal EPA has 
eliminated state discretion in favor of nationally uniform, technology-
based standards. This is not because states have formally been 
divested of their traditional roles under the CAA. It is state, not 
federal, regulators who actually decide how to implement the 
nationally uniform technology-based standards by writing them into 
individual, source-specific permits.257 State regulators are responsible 
for inspections and monitoring to ensure that sources are in 
compliance with such permits, and state regulators are the primary 
enforcers against permit violations.258  
Notwithstanding this continuing state role, Title V permits have 
been a way for the Federal EPA to assert more and more direct 
authority over the pollution abatement steps that individual plants 
must take under the CAA. One method by which the EPA has 
asserted such control is by promulgating technology-based standards 
at a finer and finer grained level of applicability.259 For example:   
256. Indeed, the decision in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 167 F.3d 
641 (D.C. Cir. 1999), was considered earth-shattering, for there the 
Court found that when Congress amended the CAA in 1990 to require 
that transportation planning in non-attainment areas be in conformity 
with the SIP requirements for such areas, it also required EPA to deny 
highway funding to any area which was currently not in attainment 
under its plan. 
257. REITZE JR., supra note 192, at 64, 229–31.  
258. Id. at 237–39; see also id. at 125 n.1330 (“Most of the effort to enforce 
[the CAA] is at the state level.”).  
259. Eric L. Hiser, Air Quality Permitting: An Increasingly Limited Tool for 
a Sustainable Future, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 774 (2011). 
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[T]he Gas Distribution Facility MACT standard applies to 
anyone who stores gasoline in a stationary container, and the 
Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engine (“RICE”) MACT 
standard applies to almost all stationary internal combustion 
engines regardless of size, which potentially captures someone 
who purchases an emergency generator at Home Depot or 
Lowe’s and chains it in place.260  
The other (and among state regulators, notorious) way that the 
federal EPA has used the permitting process as a way to directly 
regulate is by overriding permitting decisions. It might seem that 
Congress precluded such a federal regulatory role. For example, the 
§ 169(3) BACT standard for major new sources in attainment areas 
subject to the PSD program is to be determined by the “permitting 
authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, 
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.”261 A state 
agency, not the federal EPA, is the “permitting authority” responsible 
for making BACT determinations.262 As the statute expressly states 
that this BACT determination is to be made on a “case by case” basis 
involving the considering of both environmental as well as economic 
“impacts and costs,” it would seem that States do indeed retain an 
important role, even in a regime of technology-based standards.  
However, the CAA also says that the federal EPA may “take such 
measures, including issuance of an order, or seeking injunctive relief, 
as necessary to prevent the construction or modification of a major 
emitting facility which does not conform to [PSD] requirements.”263 
The federal EPA has interpreted this provision as giving it the 
authority to reject source-specific BACT determinations made by 
state permitting agencies, and in Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation v. EPA,264 (ADEC) the Supreme  
Court agreed. 
That case involved a PSD permit for the Red Dog zinc mine, 
located about one hundred miles north of the Arctic circle, near the 
native villages of Kivalina and Noatak.265 The area is relatively 
pristine and therefore subject to PSD requirements. From 1988 until 
1996, the Red Dog Mine got its power from six diesel-powered 5000-
 
260. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
261.  42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
262. See REITZE JR., supra note 192, at 81–82 (outlining the requirements 
states need to meet for “severe areas” and “extreme areas”). 
263. 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (2006). 
264. 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
265. This description of the facts is drawn from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in the case. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814 
(9th Cir. 2002), aff’d 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
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watt generators.266 In order to expand production in 1998, the mine 
agreed with the Alaska Department of Environment and Conservation 
that it would install a relatively inexpensive high combustion 
technology to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions on all six of its existing 
generators, including those that were not major sources, plus on a 
new seventh generator it needed to expand production. ADEC had 
originally proposed a more expensive catalytic reduction technology 
for the two generators that were subject to BACT requirements, but 
it accepted Red Dog’s proposal because (assuming that under typical 
operating conditions, one or more generators would be in stand-by 
mode, and not operating) installing the high combustion technology 
on all its generators would achieve the same reduction in nitrogen 
oxide emissions as ADEC’s catalytic reduction proposal but at lower 
cost.267  
At this point, the federal EPA intervened, arguing that the 
catalytic reduction technology was BACT for the two generators that 
were increasing output, and that “the PSD program does not allow 
the imposition of a limit that is less stringent than BACT even if the 
equivalent emission reductions are obtained by imposing new controls 
on other emission units.” The ADEC fought back, issuing a permit for 
Red Dog’s expansion finding that catalytic reduction was not 
economically feasible and that low NOX (the high combustion 
alternative) was preferred. The EPA responded that the mine owners 
had failed to show why catalytic reduction was infeasible. Eventually, 
after further resistance by ADEC, the federal EPA made a formal 
finding that ADEC’s authorization of Cominco’s construction and 
installation of new equipment was not in compliance with PSD 
requirements under the Clean Air Act and issued an order to Red 
Dog’s owners preventing the company from beginning construction of 
the new generator until it had demonstrated to the EPA’s satisfaction 
compliance with the Act and the SIP. 
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court sided with the 
EPA. Most significantly, the Court accepted the EPA’s argument 
that the BACT statutory definition includes an unstated limitation 
that state air permitting authorities only have the “authority to make 
reasonable BACT determinations”268 and that to “restrain the 
interjurisdictional pressures to which Congress was alert” the federal 
EPA must exercise “surveillance of a State’s BACT designation.”269 
The Court approved the EPA’s reference to the explanation given in 
 
266. Id. at 816.  
267. Id. at 816–17.  
268. Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
269. Id. at 486.  
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a House Report accompanying the 1977 CAA Amendments that 
Federal PSD standards and federal EPA “surveillance” were necessary 
so that a “State deciding to protect its clean air resources” would not 
have to face the threat that it “would lose existing industrial plants to 
more permissive States . . . . [and] become the target of ‘economic-
environmental blackmail’ from new industrial plants that will play 
one State off against another with threats to locate in whichever State 
adopts the most permissive pollution controls.”270  
As the dissenting justices in ADEC observed, accepting EPA’s 
argument that “state agencies are not to be trusted” lest they engage 
in a “‘race to the bottom,’ where jurisdictions compete with each 
other to lower environmental standards to attract new industries and 
keep existing industries within their borders” flew in the face of CAA 
language clearly giving States the “exclusive role in making BACT 
determinations.”271 According to the dissenting justices, “Congress 
made the overriding judgment that States are more responsive to 
local conditions and can strike the right balance between preserving 
environmental quality and advancing competing objectives.”272 
Moreover, the dissent argued, the Congressional decision to leave 
“certain functions to the States” so that “they would have a stake in 
implementing the environmental objectives of the [CAA]” had been 
borne out by the “real-world experience” that the states had, “by and 
large, take[n] their statutory responsibility seriously.”273  
The economics of fiscal federalism supplies a very strong 
justification for the dissenting justices’ argument in ADEC. If one 
assumes that state regulators are in the best position to evaluate the 
actual benefits of pollution reduction in a particular location, then it 
is those regulators who can best balance costs and benefits of 
alternative pollution reduction techniques proposed by a local 
polluting firm. During the period roughly between 1994 and 2008, 
environmental “regulatory reform” meant in large part giving state 
regulators greater discretion to make just such place-specific 
judgments. The Alaska regulators’ decision at the Red Dog mine in 
ADEC—to allow the firm to adopt the cheaper high combustion 
technique at all seven generators, rather than the much more 
expensive catalytic reduction technique at just two generators—
exemplified the kind of “win-win” solution that decentralization could 
find. It was the practical realization of fiscal federalism’s matching 
principle.  
 
270. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep No. 96-294, at 134 (1977)).  
271. Id. at 506–07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
272. Id. at 507. 
273. Id. 
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As a matter of statutory interpretation, of identifying 
Congressional intent in passing (and amending) the Clean Air Act, it 
was the majority and not the dissenters who were correct in ADEC v. 
EPA. As argued above, the congressional majority behind the CAA 
wanted to cushion the anticompetitive impact on older, more 
developed states of requiring costly pollution reduction. The PSD 
requirements were in the CAA to stop state regulators in less 
developed attainment regions from allowing rapid industrialization at 
the expense of older industrial areas, regardless of whether or not the 
environmental costs of new industry in attainment regions were 
greatly outweighed by other benefits (or vice versa). The movement 
toward a more comprehensive system of nationally uniform 
technology-based emission standards, to be accomplished via the new 
Title V major permit requirement, was likewise a response to the fact 
that despite PSD requirements, attainment regions had been growing 
more rapidly than the more heavily developed, non-attainment 
regions. However much one might decry the loss of state autonomy 
and economic efficiency represented by the ADEC v. EPA decision, 
one must admit that a Congress that federalized environmental air 
pollution regulation to provide economic protectionism would have 
wanted precisely that result.  
IV. The Failure of Federalization:  
Climate Change as a Case Study 
If my theory of environmental federalization is indeed capturing 
something important about that process, then it should also explain 
instances where environmental regulatory federalization has failed. 
Perhaps the most striking failure of federalization has been the lack of 
success in passing federal climate change legislation. Since the year 
2000, at least three comprehensive climate change bills have been 
introduced in the U.S. Congress. The McCain-Lieberman Climate 
Stewardship Act,274 introduced in the Senate in both 2003 and 2005, 
failed 59–37, with ten Democrats voting against it.275 In 2007, the 
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007276 (introduced by 
Senators Boxer of California and Sanders of Vermont) died in 
committee.277 And in 2009, the American Clean Energy Security 
 
274. S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005). 
275. Id. 
276. S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007). 
277. Id. 
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(ACES) Act of 2009278 was approved by the House by a close 219–212 
vote but then died in the Senate.279  
The theory set out above readily explains Congressional failure to 
pass climate change legislation. Recall first that circa 1970, Americans 
living in heavily industrialized areas across the country were 
confronted with precisely the same problem: rivers and airsheds that 
were heavily polluted by industry and the automobile. This pollution 
problem was not episodic—around for a few days and then gone—but 
a continuing presence that was limiting both recreational use of local 
resources and also further local industrial development.  
Even assuming an anthropogenic contribution to climate change, 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have not yet generated 
anything like the polluted air and waterways that confronted 
industrial America circa 1970. Heat waves, droughts, tornadoes, and 
hurricanes are said by some politicians (and even some scientists)280 to 
be a result of climate change. But not only are these pronouncements 
highly contested—with the majority of climate scientists at most 
willing to say that some extreme weather events may have become 
more likely as a result of anthropogenic climate change,281 while no 
individual weather episode can be said to be “caused” by climate 
change—there is quite literally nothing that can be done now to 
 
278. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
279. See Greg G. Hitt & Stephan Power, House Passes Climate Bill, Wall 
St. J., June 27–28, 2009, at A1. 
280. See, for example, a recent Huffington Post story in which Rutgers 
University scientist Jennifer Francis states that super storms such as 
Sandy are what would be expected if greenhouse gases continue to 
accumulate, http://huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/hurricane-sandy-
arctic-ice-climate-change n 2853220.html; see also Sam Eaton, Climate 
Change and Sandy, PBS NOVA (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/nova/earth/climate-change-sandy.html (reporting that “many” 
climate scientists believed that “climate change may well have played an 
important role in the destruction caused by Sandy a well as other recent 
extreme weather events”). 
281. This may well be an overstatement of the kind of causal attribution 
statements climate scientists are willing to make. A more accurate 
description of what most climate scientists seem to be saying is “we 
don’t know.” See, e.g., Kenneth E. Kunkel et al., Monitoring and 
Understanding Trends in Extreme Storms, 94 Bull. Am. 
Meteorological Soc’y 499, 507 (April 2013) (a literature survey with 
twenty-five climate scientist coauthors concluded that “robust detection 
of trends in Atlantic and western North Pacific TC [tropical cyclone] 
activity is significantly constrained by data heterogeneity and deficient 
quantification of internal variability. Attribution of past TC changes is 
further challenged by a lack of consensus on the physical linkages 
between climate forcing and TC activity. As a result, attribution of any 
observed trends in TC activity in these basins to anthropogenic forcing 
remains controversial”). 
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generate a short-term reduction in either the frequency or severity of 
such extreme but short-lived weather events. Contemporaneous 
weather events are taken by advocates of greenhouse gas reduction 
policies to show that climate change is real and to support the 
argument that in order to protect future generations from even worse 
such events, the United States should pass legislation to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The argument in favor of such legislation 
has not been that it will generate concrete climate benefits in the near 
term.  
The fact that a sizeable number of members of Congress have 
voted in favor of one or more of the climate change bills mentioned 
above suggests that there must be some perceived benefits to at least 
some states and congressional districts from such legislation. One such 
benefit is the satisfaction of an ideological preference for action on 
climate change. A recent econometric study has in fact shown that 
congressional ideology—liberal versus conservative on a broad 
measure of voting on environmental issues—is indeed a statistically 
significant predictor of congressional voting on the 2009 ACES Act.282 
Ideology, especially environmental ideology, is now highly correlated 
with political party affiliation. Voting on climate change legislation 
has thus become a political party “brand name” signal. Back in the 
early 1970s, environmental federalization enjoyed broad bi-partisan 
support; environmental regulation had not become an ideological 
issue. By 2000, however, environmental regulation was a highly 
ideological and polarizing issue, with the Republican “brand” 
associated with opposition to costly new environmental regulation and 
Democrats supporting such initiatives. Moreover, even within the set 
of environmental regulatory issues, climate change is perhaps the 
most ideologically polarizing.283 Thus while Democrats perceive a huge 
benefit, if not a political obligation, to vote in favor of climate change 
federalization, Republicans have precisely the opposite preference.  
It is not just the ideological polarization of the climate change 
issue that has caused the failure to enact a federal climate change law. 
The non-ideological benefits of costly action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions vary dramatically across states and Congressional districts. 
Whereas virtually every industrialized locality benefited in 1970 from 
reducing air and water pollution, many states would incur huge net 
costs were a federal law to limit and impose costs and carbon dioxide 
emissions. As of 2002, for example, in Wyoming and West Virginia, 
well over ninety-five percent of the electric power generated in each 
 
282. Michael I. Cragg et al., Carbon Geography: The Political Economy of 
Congressional Support for Legislation Intended to Mitigate Greenhouse 
Gas Production, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 1640 (2012).  
283. Dan Kahan, Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change, 488 
NATURE, Aug. 16, 2012, at 255. 
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state came from coal-fired generating units.284 For another eighteen 
states, over half of the electric power generated in the state came 
from burning coal.285 A federal law taxing or limiting generation of 
electric power from burning coal has the effect of disproportionately 
increasing the costs of locating a manufacturing plant in states that 
are so heavily reliant on coal. Conversely, as of 2002, there were nine 
states in which coal-burning electric utility generating facilities 
provided less than twenty-five percent of the power generated within 
the state.286 For such states, a federal law taxing or limiting carbon 
dioxide emissions would have relatively little impact on the electric 
power costs of industries within such states, improving the 
competitive position of such states in keeping and attracting industry. 
And this is just the power industry. When one considers industries 
that directly emit carbon dioxide—such as cement and steel—the 
impact of any federal law attaching costs to carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gas emissions would have an enormous impact on the 
relative competitiveness of different states.  
What has doomed federal climate change legislation is the fact 
that whether a state can expect to win or lose from federal legislation 
imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions is highly correlated with 
the ideology and political party of that state’s Congressional 
representatives, and party happens to be highly correlated with 
whether a state would be net short term winner or loser from 
imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions. Ideological conservatives 
on environmental issues are overwhelmingly Republican,287 and such 
environmentally conservative legislators overwhelmingly come from 
states that would be big net losers from a federal law imposing costs 
on carbon dioxide emissions. More precisely, Republican congressional 
representatives come primarily from the South and Midwest, which 
are exactly the regions that can expect to be big short-term losers 
from climate change legislation. Moreover, the states that have 
nothing much to lose from imposing costs on carbon dioxide emissions 
are in a distinct minority among states. Those states—the net short-
term winners from federal climate change legislation—are those that 
are unusually reliant on hydropower (Oregon, Washington, and 
California) or nuclear power (New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
 
284. 2001–2012 Net Generation by State by Type of Producer by Energy 
Source, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., www.eia.gov/electricity/data/ 
state (follow link to download “XLS” spreadsheet) [hereinafter U.S. 
EIA]. 
285. Id.  
286. Id. 
287. Jon P. Nelson, “Green” Voting and Ideology: LCV Scores and Roll-Call 
Voting in the U.S. Senate, 1988–1998, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 518 
(2002). 
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and Vermont).288 Over the period since 2000, there have been some 
instances when a senator’s political party affiliation or ideology does 
not line up with a state’s interest in a law imposing costs on carbon 
dioxide emissions—for example, in 2003, when both Republican 
Senator Lugar and Democrat Senator Bayh from Indiana (a likely net 
loser from carbon dioxide taxes or fees) voted in favor of federal 
climate change legislation.289 But those have been the exception and 
not the rule. 
The contrast between climate change circa 2014 and air and water 
pollution circa 1970 is stark. Federal legislation setting mandatory 
minimum standards for emissions of air pollutants brought very 
concrete and immediate environmental benefits to virtually every 
industrialized area of the country and at the same time lessened the 
competitive advantage of lesser-developed places. Federal water 
pollution legislation actually subsidized water pollution reduction in 
such industrialized areas. Federal climate change legislation would 
generate very large, anti-competitive cost increases for regions of the 
country constituting a majority in the U.S. Senate while generating 
no discernible short-term climate benefits anywhere. Indeed, according 
to the Environmental Protection Agency, the only short-term 
environmental benefit from reducing greenhouse gas emissions would 
be indirect, in the form of a reduction in conventional air pollutants 
(primarily fine particulates).290 Given that a majority of states would 
be net losers were costs imposed on carbon dioxide emissions, it is 
hardly surprising that the minority of states that would enjoy a 
competitive advantage from such cost imposition have failed to pass 
federal climate change legislation. On my theory, this failure is 
precisely what one ought to have predicted. 
 
288. For data over the entire 2001–2012 period, see U.S. EIA, supra note 284. 
Note that it is precisely such states where both Senators, from the same 
party, have voted in favor of climate change federalization. For example, 
the states with both Senators voting in favor of the 2003 McCain-
Lieberman climate change bill were California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Washington.  
289. See 108 CONG. REC. 26, 583 (2003). 
290. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 
18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
